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The Problem with Predators
June Carbone and William K. Black
ABSTRACT
Both corporate theory and sex discrimination law start with
presumptions that CEOs seek to advance legitimate ends and design the
internal organization of business enterprises to achieve such ends. Yet, a
growing literature questions why CEOs and boards of directors
nonetheless select for Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and
toxic masculinity, despite the downsides associated with these
traits. Three scholarly literatures—economics, criminology, and gender
theory—draw on advances in psychology to shed new light on the
construction of seemingly dysfunctional corporate cultures. They start by
questioning the assumption that CEOs—even CEOs of seemingly
mainstream businesses—necessarily seek to advance “legitimate” ends.
Instead, they suggest that a persistent issue is predation: the exploitation
of asymmetries in information and power to the disadvantage of
shareholders, creditors, customers, or employees. These literatures then
explore how such CEOs may rationally choose to employ seemingly
dysfunctional practices, such as “masculinity contests,” which reward
employees more likely to buy into ethically dubious activities that range
from predatory lending to sexual harassment. This Article maintains that
questioning the presumption of legitimacy has profound and largely
unexplored implications for corporate theory and anti-discrimination
law. It extends the theory of “control fraud” central to white-collar
criminology to a new concept of “control predation” that includes conduct
that is ethically objectionable, if not necessarily illegal. This Article
concludes that only by questioning the legitimacy of these practices in
business terms can gender theory adequately address women’s workplace
equality.

 Robina Chair in Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota.
 Associate Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City. We would like
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INTRODUCTION
Both corporate theory and sex discrimination law start with
presumptions that business models seek to advance legitimate ends, and
that the internal organization of business enterprises reflect reasonable
efforts to achieve such ends. Yet, a growing literature questions why
businesses nonetheless select for traits in their executives, such as “overoptimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical
self-deception,”1 despite long-standing evidence demonstrating the
downsides of these traits. Three scholarly literatures shed new light on the
construction of seemingly dysfunctional corporate cultures. They start by
questioning the assumption that businesses, even seemingly mainstream
businesses, seek to advance “legitimate” ends, and seek to identify,
instead, the hallmarks of business cultures that advance unscrupulous or
predatory ends.2 They then explore how such cultures may rationally
choose to employ seemingly dysfunctional practices, such as “masculinity
contests,” that reward employees more likely to buy into ethically dubious
activities that range from predatory lending to sexual harassment.3 In this
Article, we will maintain that questioning the presumption of “legitimacy”
has profound and largely unexplored implications for corporate theory and
anti-discrimination law.
Three bodies of work in economics, criminology, and gender theory
lay the foundation for our analysis.
First, new work in economics maintains that some companies may
adopt business models that depend on the use of manipulation and
deception to exploit customers and employees, and that such practices may
persist over time because they are so successful and profitable. In 2015,
George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, both Nobel Laureates, published
Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. The
book draws on the authors’ more technical work in economics to argue, in
terms accessible to a popular audience, that economic predation can
become a pervasive practice and that it can come to dominate entire market
sectors. While neoclassical economics assumes that markets will police
deceptive practices and corporate shareholders will depress the share
prices of companies that systematically fleece customers, Akerlof and

1. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93
GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Repugnant Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research
and Policy Agenda, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 973 (2017).
3. See Jennifer L. Berdahl et al., Work as a Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422, 422
(2018).
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Shiller demonstrate that the opposite can also be true: if companies can
prosper by cheating, they may drive more honest players from the market.4
Second, this work complements that of white-collar criminologists,
who also study predatory business practices, and explains how they can
take hold and persist in seemingly legitimate businesses. The
criminologists have shown how deceptive practices, such as the type of
predatory mortgage lending that led to the Great Financial Crisis (GFC),
can become pervasive in an industry, persuading more conventional
lenders to either adopt similar tactics or depart the field. Criminologists,
borrowing a phrase from Akerlof’s earlier work, describe the way that
fraudulent firms drive more honest ones from the market as a “Gresham’s
dynamic,” in which unscrupulous practices become so profitable that they
place more ethical lenders at a competitive disadvantage.5 The
criminologists further explain how the head of the company (the CEO) can
create powerful, perverse incentives that create a “criminogenic”
environment that normalizes the use of such predatory tactics.6 Finally,
criminologists emphasize that the key to the success of such business
models is their seeming legitimacy.7
Third, a new body of work in gender theory links gender disparities
in hiring, promotion, and wages to predatory business models.8 Of the ten
occupations with the largest pay gap between men and women, four are in
the finance industry, including the top category—financial advisors.9 The
literature on personal financial advisors has become increasingly critical
of the conflicts of interest that arise from tying advisers’ income to the
commissions they generate for selling products with high fees that may
not necessarily be in their clients’ interests. 10 Recent studies also show
that male financial advisors are more likely to commit misconduct than
4. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF
MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION 164 (2015) (describing failure to deal with consequences of
deception and trickery); see also description of “Gresham’s dynamic,” infra note 5 and accompanying
text (describing how disreputable dealers can drive honest dealers from the market).
5. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970).
6. See WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 3, 5 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter BLACK,
BEST WAY].
7. See infra Part II.
8. See Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing
Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425 (2018) [hereinafter Cahn et al.,
Gender and the Tournament]; see also June Carbone, Naomi Cahn & Nancy Levit, Women, RuleBreaking, and The Triple Bind, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
9. See Catherine Clifford, These 10 Jobs Have the Largest and Smallest Pay Gaps Between Men
and Women, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/09/the-10-jobs-with-the-largestand-smallest-gender-pay-gaps.html [https://perma.cc/N5HN-NQ4V].
10. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181 (2017).
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female advisors but are less likely to be fired as a result of it.11 The result
creates a triple bind that limits women’s success if they do not engage in
the same behavior as the men, punishing them more severely when they
do, and discouraging them from applying, in part because of prior
women’s lack of success in the enterprise.12 Anti-discrimination suits,
however, tend to take practices, such as commissions tied to unjustifiable
fees, at face value.13 If the lawsuits were to examine the connections
between the predatory business models and the impact on female
employees, they might find that the environments most hostile to women
also display other dubious practices. The business case for diversity
suggests that greater diversity improves firm performance,14 but the
studies finding an empirical correlation between diversity and
performance have yet to explain which way the causal arrows run. This
Article suggests that the key to both greater diversity and improved
business performance may be ethical teamwork. Yet, the role of teamwork
and collaboration generally as the link between the two is rarely examined.
Taken together, these three bodies of work shed new light on what
seem to be dysfunctional corporate cultures and the challenges they pose
to corporate theory and anti-discrimination law. As Milton Friedman
observes, standard corporate theory assumes that responsible business
executives, at a minimum, obey the law and, more robustly, that market
forces encourage ethical practices.15 Yet, modern economic theory
demonstrates that markets may, in fact, promote unscrupulous practices in
the face of legal laxity, laxity in enforcement, or simply difficulty in
detection.16 This, in turn, casts the almost century-long debate on
stakeholder theory in a different light.17 Engaging in shady practices may,
in fact, increase shareholder value, at least in the short to medium term, at
the expense of long-term shareholder and societal interests. In addition,
11. Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in
Punishing Misconduct 2–3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 19–047, 2017), https://www.hbs.
edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/19-047_be957781-c55c-4be0-994d-a29875374f32.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/R5F6-8JU5].
12. See Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8, at 447.
13. Id. at 437 (arguing that courts rarely examine the legitimacy of business practices that
disadvantage women).
14. Marcus Noland, Tyler Moran & Barbara Kotschwar, Is Gender Diversity Profitable?
Evidence from a Global Survey 3 (Peterson Inst. for Int.’l Econ., Working Paper No. 16-3, 2016);
Aimee Picchi, In Business, More Women at the Top Means More Profits, CBS NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-women-more-profits/ [https://perma.cc/A5CN-3BHT].
15. Milton Friedman, A Friedman doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
16. Cf. Akerlof, supra note 5, at 495.
17. See generally Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate
Governance Reform in Context, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001 (2013) (summarizing the debate over
corporate purposes).
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these practices may also correspond to insular and dysfunctional corporate
cultures, linked to various kinds of in-group favoritism, without the
practices being actionable in accordance with conventional
anti-discrimination doctrines.18
These conclusions suggest that a rethinking of the core assumptions
of market theory and their relationship to corporate stakeholder doctrine
and anti-discrimination law are long overdue.
I. PREDATION, STAKEHOLDERS, AND ECONOMIC THEORY
Over the course of more than a century, corporate legal theorists have
debated the question of whose interests corporations should serve: that of
their shareholders or a broader group of stakeholders including workers,
customers, and the broader community.19 In the context of this debate,
theorists have assumed that corporations generally pursue legitimate
ends20 but differ on the question of how corporations should approach
ethically dubious practices.
In the background of that debate are two issues. First, which
corporate abuses are the most concerning? In every era, theorists have
viewed predation, defined as the exploitation of asymmetries in
information and power through manipulation and deceit,21 as a problem to
be addressed. And in every era, theorists have been concerned with the
potential for corporate form to be used as a means to exacerbate
asymmetries in power and information while insulating managers from
accountability.22 But the theorists have not agreed on the priorities they
assign to different types of potential abuses.
Second, how do internal corporate management and external
regulation relate to each other? Predation typically involves a group of
insiders using corporate form to exploit “outsiders,” who may be

18. See Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8.
19. O’Kelley, supra note 17, at 1002 (tracing the history from the Civil War forward).
20. Historically, however, a counter-narrative has also existed that sees corporations as
instruments for criminality. See, e.g., 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 741 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1776) (warning of manager’s abuse of “other
people’s money”); see also Stanton Wheeler & Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The Organization as
Weapon in White-Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1403 (1982).
21. See, e.g., AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 4, at 164 (observing that modern economics
“inherently fails to grapple with deception and trickery. People’s naivete and susceptibility to
deception have been swept under the rug”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership:
The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 28
(2001) (noting that because of the risk of corruption, prominent underwriters refused until the end of
the nineteenth century to underwrite the common stock of industrial corporations); Edwin H.
Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 3 (1940) (discussing role of corporate
deceit).
22. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 20, at 741.
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employees, customers, creditors, minority shareholders, or the public.23
Should there be a clear demarcation between the fiduciary duties officers
owe shareholders and external regulation for the protection of external
stakeholders, of employees, customers, and the general public? Or should
both types of constraints on managerial freedom of action be thought of
together?
To explore these ideas, this Part will set forth the positions of Adolf
Berle, Milton Friedman, George Akelof, and Robert Shiller. Berle’s
primary concern involved the role of control blocks, consisting of
dominant shareholders and managers, who misused power to disadvantage
individual shareholders, minority shareholders as a group, and by
extension, the larger public. Friedman, writing in a different era, opposed
the ability of managers to advance their own political or social values at
the expense of shareholders’ interest in profit maximization. Akerlof and
Shiller express their greatest concern about business models in which the
exploitation of the others is a primary objective. These theorists
nonetheless agree that predation is an issue of concern and that internal
governance and external regulation tend to reinforce each other in
creating—and potentially combatting—abuses.
A. Round One: Berle and Means
Adolf Berle’s work framed the issue, taking the position that so long
as corporations exercised the type of power that made them akin to
principalities, they should have obligations to a greater group of
stakeholders than merely shareholders interested in maximizing profits or
share prices. In taking this position, Berle’s principal concern focused on
the abuses of a control group of dominant shareholders and managers, who
exercised power over the corporation, often to the detriment of individual
shareholders and minority shareholders as a group.24 As one commentator
of the period observed, “the fat boys, no longer content with their ancient
perquisite of milking the public, are now engaged in the dizzy and lofty
job of squeezing their own shareholders dry!”25 Berle, however, saw the
consequences of predation on shareholders as affecting not just the
shareholders themselves but also the larger community. In his influential
volume with Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, the authors wrote that:
23. See, e.g., AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 4, at 2–3, 23–45 (providing examples that range
from Cinnabon enticing customers with hard to resist aromas to accounting fraud).
24. ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 244–52 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. revised ed., 1968) (1932) (describing individual
shareholders’ diminished power within the corporation).
25. Stuart Chase, Professor Quixote, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 1927, at 263.
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The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a
giant corporation is a tremendous force [that] can harm or benefit a
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The
organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm
of private enterprise—they have become more nearly social
institutions.26

Berle accordingly argued that both fiduciary duties owed to internal
stakeholders and external regulations, such as disclosure requirements,
should be designed to curb such practices to promote shareholder value
and the larger public good. Thus, in his classic debate with Merrick Dodd,
he maintained that only fiduciary duties to shareholders, and not duties to
a larger group of stakeholders, provided a sufficiently determinant legal
standard to make enforcement realistic and mangers accountable.27 Berle
did not take this position because he necessarily favored maximizing
returns for shareholders as the sole acceptable corporate purpose; instead,
he saw such a standard as the only practical way to restrain managerial
power.28
In describing corporations this way, Berle and Means saw legal
regulation as more than a matter of privately enforceable fiduciary duties.
Instead, they suggested that the ambit for oversight should follow the
nature and power of the institutions, inviting a farther-reaching regulatory
approach. The authors questioned whether, given the increased
concentration of power in modern corporations, the ends of the company
should be thought of, not as the maximization of profits, but as a “purely
neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the
community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the
basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”29 Public oversight
should thus seek both to protect individual shareholders from the control
group and to advance public ends.

26. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 46.
27. See Adolf A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931); Adolf A. Berle Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1367–68 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees] (responding
to E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153
(1932), arguing that corporate managers should be seen as answerable to a broader group of
stakeholders).
28. See, e.g., Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, supra note 27, at 1367. Berle
observed that when management’s fiduciary obligations to shareholders weaken, “the management
and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute.” Id.
29. See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and
the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 353–
56 (2013).
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Finally, in his later work, Berle argued that corporate managers
should have the discretion to take broader social interests into account and
that fiduciary duties should be interpreted in that light.30 By the time he
adopted this position in 1959, however, corporations were widely seen as
adopting such an approach, in part, because of the greater power of unions
and the state limiting management power.31
Berle, thus, saw corporate governance and legal regulation as
operating in tandem; to the extent corporate power implicated a broader
set of interests, the corporation had a duty to take those interests into
account, and regulation of the corporation was considered appropriate in
order to protect those interests. He argued that the concentration of power
in the modern corporation was too great to expect markets to police either
obligations to shareholders or to the broader community.32
B. Round Two: Milton Friedman
By 1970, Berle’s notion that the modern corporation should be
governed in accordance with public policy objectives rather than “private
cupidity” was under attack. Milton Friedman lodged an early assault.33
In his 1962 volume on Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman, in a
manner not so different from Berle’s description of corporate fiduciary
duties, saw maximizing shareholder profits as a concrete and determinant
standard and saw alternative managerial objectives as subjective,
inconsistent, and lacking any meaningful economic guidance.34 Friedman,
however, did not just see maximizing shareholder profits as a legal
standard for fiduciary obligations; he saw it as the principle executives
should use in guiding corporations. He wrote, “Few trends could so
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to
30. See ADOLF A. BERLE JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 107–10 (1959).
31. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER, 141–57 (1952) (explaining the role of unions as a countervailing power);
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 140–48 (1967) (describing rise of the
“technostructure” as opposed to profit maximization).
32. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 282–85.
33. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 679 (1986) (citing Friedman’s New
York Times essay and calling it “[p]erhaps the most notable justification of the strict profitmaximizing goal”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 564 (2003) (“Milton Friedman’s famous essay on
corporate responsibility remains the classic statement of the shareholder primacy model.”); Ronald
Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 149 (2004) (summarizes reaction to Friedman).
34. See Thomas J. Horton, Restoring American Antitrust’s Moral Arc, 62 S.D. L. REV. 11, 15
(2017); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) (objecting to the
managerial system as allowing managers to impose their value preferences on investors).
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make as much money for their stockholders as possible.”35 Friedman
objected to corporate managers imposing their own values (or the values
of other stakeholders) on shareholders.36
Friedman acknowledged, however, that a business is justified in
maximizing profits only so long as it “stays . . . within the rules of the
game” and “engages in open and free competition, without deception or
fraud.”37 This analysis raised a potential problem for his theory.
Government regulation ordinarily set “the rule of the game,” the terms that
determine “open and free competition,” and the definitions of the practices
that constitute “deception or fraud.”38 Were business executives therefore
compelled to engage in practices that added to profits right up to the letter
of the law, exploiting legally gray areas, however odious?39 And if so, did
that invite regulators to act more aggressively to protect other
stakeholders, such as employees or customers, since Friedman argued that
business executives should not take their interests into consideration
unless the law required it?40
To address these issues, Friedman amended his initial statement in
an op-ed in the New York Times in 1970, advocating shareholder primacy.
He wrote: “[A] corporate executive[’s] . . . responsibility is to conduct the
business in accordance with [shareholders’] desires, which generally will
35. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 133.
36. See Fulton Friedman, A Friednzan Doctrine , N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at SM 17,
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-ofbusiness-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/7DVQ-PPH6] (giving the example of making “expenditures on
reducing pollution beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the corporation or that is required
by law in order to contribute to the social objective of improving the environment” as an illustration
of managers imposing values on shareholders that they might not share).
37. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 133.
38. See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton, Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost Values, 16 U.N.H.L. REV. 179,
241 (2018) (arguing that “competitive fairness, level economic playing fields, economic justice, a
healthy diversity of competitors, and reduced economic concentration are actually crucial economic
values in the sense that they provide the foundational underpinnings for a healthy, stable, and
sustainable capitalistic economic system” and should be seen as the appropriate subject of antitrust
law). “Deception and fraud” as criminal acts are defined by criminal statutes, though they may be also
be actionable as part of common civil actions. For a discussion of the tensions between the legal
definition of fraud as a crime and ethical and civil definitions of wrongful deceptive acts, see infra
notes 69–76 and accompanying text, and see also Horton, supra note 34, at 239–42 (discussing the
implications for antitrust law).
39. See Friedman, supra note 36 (indeed, his example of a corporation spending more for
pollution control than the law requires suggests such a result).
40. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 33, at 30–32 (noting the existence of extensive regulation
addressing workers, consumers, and other stakeholders); Chen & Hanson, supra note 33, at 55–57
(describing how shareholder primacy can coexist with protection of other stakeholder interests through
legal or social protections outside of the business); Christopher Cosans, Does Milton Friedman
Support a Vigorous Business Ethics?, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 391, 391, 395 (2009) (“Several scholars have
argued that Friedman asserts that businesses have no or minimal social duties beyond compliance with
the law.”).
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be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules
of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical
custom.”41 This later statement does two things. It further acknowledges
that corporate executives do have ethical responsibilities not to maximize
profits at any cost; Friedman did not endorse unscrupulous predatory
practices. In addition, by rooting these “basic rules of the society” not just
in law, but in ethical customs, he could deflect calls for more regulation.
Indeed, Friedman, at the same time that he argued that corporate
executives should not take into account any interests other than
shareholder profits, also maintained that free market principles, not
regulation, provided the best protection for other interests. With respect to
consumers, for example, he and Rose Friedman wrote that “market
competition, when it is permitted to work, protects the consumer better
than do the alternative government mechanisms that have been
increasingly superimposed on the market.”42 Other free market advocates
maintain that reputational interests will protect against shoddy products or
oppressive working conditions.43
In Friedman’s view, advocacy for shareholder primacy, therefore,
need not be inconsistent with ethical behavior.44 And to the extent
individual companies might be tempted to cut corners, fleece customers,
or oppress employees, market mechanisms and private intermediaries
could be expected to respond, tarnishing the reputation of the
perpetrators.45 In Friedman’s world, therefore, neither private fiduciary
obligations to nonshareholder stakeholders nor public intervention were
necessary to restrain private cupidity.
C. Round 3: Akerlof and Shiller
George Akerlof won the Nobel Prize in 2001 for his work on “lemons
markets,”46 that is, markets that sell defective or low-quality products.
Akerlof’s article began what economists call the “information revolution,”
which involves the rejection of the assumption that markets incorporate
41. See Friedman, supra note 36.
42. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 222
(1980).
43. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL
ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 157–72 (Paul Zak ed., 2008) (discussing the degree to which
markets take ethics into account); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 280, 283 (1991) (arguing that “a rule against fraud is not
an essential or even necessarily an important ingredient of securities markets”).
44. See Cosans, supra note 40, at 394–96.
45. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 33, at 55–57 (describing how shareholder primacy can
coexist with protection of other stakeholder interests through legal or social protections outside of the
business).
46. See generally Akerlof, supra note 5 (noting Akerlof’s work on “lemons” in the market).
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perfect information.47 Instead, Akerlof, both in his 1970 article and in his
more recent work with Robert Shiller, explores the way that markets deal
with “asymmetrical information,” that is, where one party has
substantially more information than another party. This work challenges
the conventional wisdom that markets police fraud and misrepresentation.
Instead, Akerlof describes circumstances in which asymmetrical
information makes predatory behavior profitable and market forces—
rather than counter such behavior—encourage it, driving honest
competitors out of the market.
To illustrate his point, Akerlof initially focused on used car markets
as an example of the impact of asymmetrical information. In these
markets, used car dealers are in a position to know more about the cars
they are selling than customers do. They are also in a position to disguise
the quality of the cars they hawk by withholding information, covering up
defects, or illegally resetting odometers.48 Before Akerlof’s article,
economists assumed that consumers could detect quality, or if quality was
difficult to determine, dealers could distinguish their products by offering
guarantees of quality, such as extended warranties or reliable third parties
to provide assistance.49
Akerlof challenged this conventional wisdom in two critical ways.
First, he introduced and named the “Gresham’s dynamic,” one of the most
important concepts in both economics and white-collar criminology.50
Akerlof explained the perverse result: “[D]ishonest dealings tend to drive
honest dealings out of the market.”51 In plain English, market forces make
fraud and predation endemic. Rather than market forces producing ways
to detect fraud or facilitating the segmentation of the market into
higher-quality and lower-quality goods, market forces could instead lower
the quality of products in the entire market. Second, Akerlof demonstrated
that no particular outcome was inevitable. One possible outcome was that
the market for high quality goods could fail entirely. Consumers, unable
to determine with certainty whether they were buying “lemons,” would

47. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Revolution of Information Economics: The Past and the
Future (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23780, 2017).
48. Odometer Fraud, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/
equipment/odometer-fraud [https://perma.cc/TJS3-GD56] (federal authorities estimate that 450,000
cars a year are sold with illegally reset odometers, causing consumer losses of a billion a year).
49. See Akerlof, supra note 5, at 497–500 (describing warranties, brand-names, chains, and
licensing and certification practices as the classic market-based responses to the problem in
indeterminate quality and arguing that they do not prevent the existence of “lemons markets”).
50 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of
“Pay for Performance”, 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 556 (2014).
51. Akerlof, supra note 5, at 495.
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pay much less for used cars than new cars, driving honest dealers selling
higher quality used cars out of the market entirely.52
Akerlof reports that he initially had trouble getting the article
published. In rejecting the article that would eventually contribute to
Akerlof’s Nobel Prize in Economics, the editors of The American
Economic Review and The Review of Economic Studies explained that
their journals “did not publish papers on subjects of such triviality.”53
Akerlof and Robert Shiller wrote Phishing for Phools: The Economics of
Manipulation and Deception to demonstrate that the problem of
asymmetric information was one of more general application than merely
the used car market. The book argues that markets generally do not
necessarily promote the greater good. Instead, the free-market system
systematically exploits our weaknesses and “manipulate[s] us through our
subconscious.”54 The authors describe deception as everything from the
way Cinnabon uses enticing aromas to lure airport travelers into its stores
to rating agencies that contributed to the financial system boom and bust
of the last decade.55 Their overall conclusion is that businesses routinely
rely on predation, manipulation, and exploitation of psychological
predispositions to fatten the bottom line.56 Joseph Stiglitz explained the
potentially far-reaching implications:
In markets with some, but imperfect competition, firms strive to
increase their market power and to increase the extraction of rents
from existing market power, giving rise to widespread distortions. In
such circumstances, institutions and the rules of the game matter.
Public policy is critical in setting the rules of the game.57

Stiglitz concluded further that the role of asymmetric information in
preventing “perfect competition” means that markets may not be efficient
and that correcting the problems that arise may be complex and costly.58
In the meantime, the distributional effects can be significant, allowing
those in a position to exploit asymmetries in information and market power
52. Id. at 489–90.
53. George Akerlof, Writing the “The Market for ‘Lemons’”: A Personal and Interpretive Essay,
NOBEL PRIZE (Nov. 14, 2003), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2001/akerlof
/article/ [https://perma.cc/24AQ-55MP].
54. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 4, at 7 (observing that the free market system automatically
exploits our weaknesses).
55. See generally id. at 2–3 (discussing Cinnabon), 23–34 (discussing role of rating agencies
during the financial crisis).
56. See Emma Coleman Jordan, The Hidden Structures of Inequality: The Federal Reserve and
a Cascade of Failures, 2 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 107, 180 (2017) (characterizing their conclusion as
one that “the nature of free markets makes predation and manipulation inevitable features of most
markets”).
57. Stiglitz, supra note 47, at 2.
58. Id. at 4–6.
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to profit handsomely at the expense of others, thereby undermining the
effectiveness of the market as a whole.59
This recharacterization poses a challenge to both elements of
Friedman’s argument for shareholder profit maximization. First, it
suggests that markets are unlikely to police corporate ethics. Akerlof and
Shiller argue that, in many cases, the dividing line between ethically
justifiable and illegal practices will be on a continuum, creating incentives
to exploit gray areas, and, even where the dividing line is clear, market
forces may make it impossible to compete in some markets without
crossing those lines.60 At the height of the mortgage boom, for example,
an honest home appraiser may have found herself without many
customers. Second, any suggestion that corporate officers and directors
have a duty to maximize shareholder returns within such markets
inevitably invites unethical behavior. And a call for deregulation makes
things worse, since it might further blur the lines between ethically
acceptable and unacceptable actions and make it harder for honest firms
to compete at all, much less maximize profits, without engaging in
unethical behavior. Friedman, of course, in his discussion of market
regulation with co-author Rose Friedman, assumed that consumers might
prefer cheaper options, even if it meant lesser quality.61 Akerlof
demonstrated, however, that if the consumer cannot determine quality, the
effect may be what Friedman opposed: fewer consumer options.62 In a
lemons market, both the reputable seller, who might prefer to supply
higher-quality goods at higher prices, and the consumer, who would prefer
to buy such goods, would be at a disadvantage and could be driven from
the market.63 Indeed, Akerlof began his lemons markets article observing
that asymmetric information is a major reason why many consumers buy
only new cars, creating a dramatically greater price differential between
new and used cars than differences in average quality alone might
warrant.64 Akerlof’s publication of these points in his August 1970

article made Friedman’s position on profit maximization via
predation untenable. Friedman responded promptly in his
September 13, 1970 op ed by stating that CEOs had an ethical duty
not to predate.

59. Id. at 6.
60. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 4.
61. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 222.
62. See Akerlof, supra note 5.
63. Akerlof, supra note 5, at 489–90.
64. Id. at 489.
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Friedman’s defenders can and have objected to such claims as
imprecise or paternalistic.65 Some even object that they enjoy Cinnabon.
Akelof and Shiller argue, however, that the consequences are not always
as benign as one thousand extra calories, noting the increased intensity of
financial crises and their aftermaths, the threat from potentially dangerous
drugs, and the systemic effects that might occur from undermining overall
confidence in markets.66
The issues we explore here, though, involve the consequences for
business cultures. If, in fact, markets not only fail to deter, but also actively
encourage unethical behavior, how does that affect internal management?
And does the answer change if predation depends on deception, that is, on
maintaining the appearance of legitimate business purposes and cloaking
the predatory nature of certain practices? At a minimum, this analysis
suggests that fiduciary duties alone cannot address the issue and that a
single-minded focus on profit maximization can make things worse.
D. Predation and Corporate Management
The possibility that corporate form can be an aid to predation changes
the discussion of business purposes and the parameters of shareholder
value. While theorists such as Milton Friedman and Joseph Stiglitz did not
agree on much, they both recognized the dangers of predation and agreed
that the limit on profit maximization should be an observation of standard
ethical practices. Stiglitz recognizes that sustaining such ethical practices
is not easy to do; Friedman largely ignored the question of the source of
“ethical custom.” If, as Akerlof and Shiller suggest, markets promote
predation or ethically dubious practices more generally, these practices
necessarily affect the understandings of corporate governance. The next
Part examines the implications for understanding the construction of
corporate cultures.
II. PREDATION, CRIMINOLOGY AND CORPORATE CULTURES
White-collar criminologists have always recognized the possibility
that corporations could be used as instruments of predation,67 and, indeed,
the traditional efforts to define white-collar crime incorporate concepts
very similar to Akerlof and Shiller’s models of predation. In his
65. See, e.g., Alex Tabarrok, A Phool and His Money, THE NEW RAMBLER (2015), https://newr
amblerreview.com/book-reviews/economics/a-phool-and-his-money [https://perma.cc/6WPV-3Y34]
(reviewing GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, PHISHING FOR FOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF
MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION (2015)).
66. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 4, at 23–45 (discussing financial crisis and confidence in
markets), 223, 248 (discussing dangerous drugs).
67. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 28.
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presidential address to the American Sociological Association, Edwin
Sutherland defined white-collar criminology as a distinct field, arguing
that white-collar crime consists principally of the “violation of delegated
or implied trust,” most typically in the form of misrepresentation of asset
values or duplicity in the manipulation of power.68 In addition, Sutherland
recognized that, like predation generally, notions of corporate wrongdoing often straddle the line between legal and illegal.69 He emphasized
that the challenge for those who would study the relationship between
business entities and crime is the fact that so much of business wrongdoing
is either not criminal or not viewed as criminal even when it violates the
law, frustrating precise definitions of the phenomena.70
In the years since, modern criminology has focused on the role of the
enterprise in white-collar crime, creating a structure for the examination
of corporate cultures primed to engage in predation. The modern era starts
with Stanton Wheeler and Mitchell Lewis Rothman’s seminal article, The
Organization as Weapon in White-Collar Crime.71 Wheeler and Rothman
argued that “the organization, size and profitably notwithstanding, is for
white-collar criminals what the gun or knife is for the common criminal—
a tool to obtain money from victims.”72 They emphasize that “the
organizational form itself, and public perceptions warped by imagemaking, combine to give the organization a heightened sense of
legitimacy.”73
Later scholars would build on Wheeler and Rothman’s insights to
argue that corporate form plays a critical role in the seeming legitimacy of
the enterprise and the ability to create the trust that Sutherland described
as critical to understanding white-collar crime.74 This work distinguishes
white-collar crime, or fraud that employs the organization itself as a
weapon, from fraud committed by rogue traders or embezzlers and shows
that the dollar losses from the former are dramatically greater.75 The most
recent work in criminology has focused on the mechanisms that allow
organizations to become “weapons” of wrongdoing, describing the
creation of corporate cultures that facilitate predation and rule breaking, if
not necessarily outright criminality.76
68. Sutherland, supra note 21, at 3.
69. Id. at 1–3.
70. Id.
71. Wheeler & Rothman, supra note 20.
72. Id. at 1406.
73. Id. at 1424.
74. See, e.g., BLACK, BEST WAY, supra note 6, at 4.
75. Wheeler & Rothman, supra note 20, at 1414, 1417–18 (showing dramatically greater losses
and social impact from crimes using the organization as a weapon).
76. See, e.g., Henry N. Pontell & Gilbert Geis, The Trajectory of White-Collar Crime Following
the Great Economic Meltdown, 30 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 70 (2014).
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This Part will consider these mechanisms as they relate to predation.
First, the Part will start with the concept of “control fraud” and “control
predation,” that is, a description of how fraud (and by extension predation)
orchestrated from the top of a corporation differs from such activities
undertaken by individuals. Second, it will note the importance of the
appearance of legitimacy in conducting the activities. Third, it will
examine the role of performance pay in creating incentives that encourage
predatory conduct while preserving the appearance of legitimacy. Fourth,
it will consider the combination of shareholder primacy and short-termism
in encouraging the practices. Fifth, it will link these practices to corporate
tolerance for seemingly dysfunctional behavior, such as the tolerance of
arrogant and ineffective managers. Finally, it will link these practices to
the traditional consideration of conflicts between corporations and other
stakeholders and conclude that the modern emphasis on shareholder value
combines with the relaxation of ethical constraints on predation to shape
corporate cultures.
A. Control Fraud and Predation
The term “control fraud” refers to the use of the firm as a “weapon”
for corruption or criminality.77 For control fraud, those in charge of the
firm (referred to as a matter of convenience as the CEOs) are necessarily
complicit.78 Indeed, control frauds typically occur because the CEO
creates a “criminogenic environment,” that is, one conducive to criminal
or duplicitous behavior.79 The CEO is particularly poised to create such
environments through:
 Optimizing the firm’s operations and structures for fraud;
 Setting a corrupt tone at the top, suborning internal controls, and
recruiting employees, officers, and internal and external
‘controls’ as allies;

77. BLACK, BEST WAY, supra note 6, at 1.
78. See Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging Ethics in Organizations: A Review of Some Key Research
Findings, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (2014) (discussing the ability of the CEO to set the tone,
whether ethical or predatory).
79. See, e.g., Sally S. Simpson, Making Sense of White-Collar Crime: Theory and Research,
8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 481, 492 (2011) (“Beginning with Sutherland, research consistently has shown
that some industries are more criminogenic than others and that structural characteristics—especially
those related to the political and economic environment of the market—are critical factors associated
with white-collar offending.”); Robert Tillman, Making the Rules and Breaking the Rules: The
Political Origins of Corporate Corruption in the New Economy, 51 CRIM. L. & SOC. CHANGE 73, 73–
74 (2009) (explaining why corporate environments have become “criminogenic”).
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Converting firm assets for the CEO’s personal benefit through
seemingly normal corporate compensation mechanisms;80 and
 Optimizing the external environment for control fraud, e.g., by
using firm resources to lobby for favorable regulatory
environments.81
Control fraud, thus, involves organizations where the CEO
deliberately primes the organization to engage in unscrupulous conduct,
and the corporate culture reflects these efforts.
Predation differs from fraud in that it is not necessarily illegal. In the
context of used car markets, for example, resetting an odometer violates
the law.82 Persuading car buyers to take out a loan with an above-market
interest rate ordinarily does not.83 The ethics underlying the practices,
however, may not be terribly different whether the practices involve
technical legal violations or not. Both may involve targeting naïve or
vulnerable customers and exploiting asymmetries in information.84 Each
practice may involve the failure to disclose information that the dealer
knows that the customer would find valuable, though, in the case of the
loans, dealers may stop short of engaging in the kind of active
misrepresentation that would constitute actionable fraud. Finally, both
involve developing a degree of rapport with the customer that encourages
trust in circumstances where the dealer intends to betray that trust by
selling the customer a product (in this case a high-interest loan) that
benefits the dealer at the expense of the customer.85 And, the harm from
predation may be similar to, if not greater than, the harm from outright
illegality.86
Moreover, CEOs (or other top executives) can create a firm culture
encouraging these activities while deliberately insulating themselves from
knowledge of the particular acts of their employees. Take, for example,
80. See, e.g., William K. Black, The Department of Justice “Chases Mice While Lions Roam the
Campsite”: Why the Department Has Failed to Prosecute the Elite Frauds That Drove the Financial
Crisis, 80 UMKC L. REV. 987, 992 (2012); Sharon Hannes & Avraham Tabbach, Executive Stock
Options: The Effects of Manipulation on Risk Taking, 38 J. CORP. L. 533, 541 (2013) (concluding that
“[t]he theoretical and empirical literatures both reveal a link between equity-based compensation
(especially options) and financial misrepresentation”).
81. Black, supra note 80, at 992.
82. See Odometer Fraud, supra note 48.
83. See, e.g., MARK A. COHEN, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., REPORT ON THE RACIAL IMPACT OF
AHFC’S FINANCE CHARGE MARKUP POLICY (2003), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/litigation/
closed/ahfc-cohenreportappendices-a-c.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XPQ-GS5Q] (doing so in a way that
targets minority buyers or deliberately misleads, however, may violate various laws and regulations);
Caroline E. Mayer, Car-Loan Rates Marked Up More for Blacks, Report Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
2003, at E01.
84. Akerlof, supra note 5, at 495–96.
85. COHEN, supra note 83.
86. See Stiglitz, supra note 47, at 18.
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Goldman Sachs’s activities during the financial crisis, which encouraged
a firm culture that incentivized customer deception without accountability
for top executives. Goldman’s CEO openly joked about treating the firm’s
clients as “adversaries,”87 demonstrating awareness of the culture. In 2012,
Greg Smith, a former Goldman Vice President, described this mindset as
a pervasive part of the firm’s culture. He observed that traders prized the
quickest ways to make money at the firm and termed one “hunting
elephants,” which involved targeting the most unsophisticated clients who
could be deceived into generating the biggest profits for Goldman.88 Smith
stated, “It makes me ill how callously people talk about ripping their
clients off.”89
Consider, in turn, how such a culture could encourage such activities
without top executives running afoul of the legal standard for fraud cases.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) brought a civil securities fraud action against
Goldman Sachs and one of its employees, Fabrice Tourre, a midlevel
trader in his twenties.90 The SEC charges involved misleading a German
bank about the quality of the securities Tourre sold at a time when
Goldman believed that the housing market was beginning to collapse.91
The press described Tourre as “the lowest man on the totem pole.”92 The
SEC targeted Tourre personally because he described his role in the project
in emails to his girlfriend, bragging that he sold toxic mortgage bonds to
“widows and orphans that I ran into at the airport.”93 The SEC complaint
alleged that Tourre had “put together a complicated financial product that
87. CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: PROMOTING
GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 104 (2015) (describing how the Goldman
CEO joked about treating clients as “adversaries”).
88. Id. at 102–03.
89. Id. at 103.
90. Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime
Mortgage CDO, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 15, 2010) [hereinafter Goldman
Sachs], https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm [https://perma.cc/DP7K-W9K2]; Jesse
Eisinger, Why the S.E.C. Didn’t Hit Goldman Sachs Harder, NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-the-s-e-c-didnt-hit-goldman-sachs-harder [https:
//perma.cc/EW4C-SQBU] (for an account of the failure to prosecute for these activities).
91. Goldman Sachs, supra note 90; see Samuel Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J.
511, 513 (2011) (describing the customer as a German bank); Ben Protess, Former Goldman Trader
Tourre Says He Will Not Appeal, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 27, 2014), https://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2014/05/27/former-goldman-trader-tourre-says-he-will-not-appeal/ [https://perma.cc/
M6HE-TC2G] (estimating the losses at $1 billion).
92. Eisinger, supra note 90.
93. Sam Gustin, Not So ‘Fabulous’ Fab: Ex-Goldman Sachs Trader Fabrice Tourre Found
Liable for Fraud, TIME (Aug. 1, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/08/01/not-so-fabulous-fab-exgoldman-sachs-trader-found-liable-for-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/8FAW-UHL4]. The customers were
actually “elephants,” that is, a German bank unaware that the American housing market was cooling
off.
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was secretly designed to maximize the likelihood that it would fail, and
marketed and sold it to investors without appropriate disclosure,”94
resulting in approximately $1 billion in losses.95 The SEC did not bring
individual charges against Tourre’s supervisors because the SEC could not
prove that they knew the particulars that made Tourre’s actions
fraudulent.96 The SEC settled its institutional case against Goldman but
won its civil case against Tourre at trial.97
A firm culture that encourages selling arcane financial products to
unwitting customers, awards outsized bonuses for doing so, and provides
little direct oversight encourages these activities. Individual employees
like Tourre make the final call on which legal or ethical lines to cross.98
To the extent that upper management engineers the culture, sets the terms
for the bonuses, and determines the level of oversight—including the
practices that insulate senior managers from knowledge of the details—
this is control fraud. In the Tourre case, there is certainly evidence that
Goldman encouraged its employees to unload mortgage-backed securities
in the early days of the financial crisis.99 Goldman, after all, profited
handsomely from the fees Tourre generated in this and any number of
similar transactions.100 And even if the SEC charged Goldman as an
institution with securities fraud, the executives who benefitted from
Tourre’s actions faced no individual liability. True “rogue traders” more
typically enrich themselves at company expense.101
The idea of control fraud also emphasizes the power of the CEO at
the expense of other corporate players, including shareholders.
Consideration of CEO power in the abstract can, however, be misleading.
The traditional debate in corporate theory is between the managerial age
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See generally Buell, supra note 91, at 530.
97. Gustin, supra note 93 (stating that Goldman paid for Tourre’s legal fees).
98. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS 3 (2003) (describing the increased difficulty of controlling rogue traders in the
modern era).
99. See Alison Frankel, Is This the Inside Info that Triggered Goldman’s MBS “Big Short”?,
REUTERS (July 9, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/07/09/is-this-the-inside-infothat-triggered-goldmans-mbs-big-short/ [https://perma.cc/5XRB-XRWK] (in 2016, Goldman entered
into a $5 billion settlement with the Justice Department, admitting its role in questionable activities
involving mortgage-backed securities); Lucinda Shen, Goldman Finally Admits it Defrauded Investors
During the Financial Crisis, FORTUNE (Apr. 11, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/11/goldmansachs-doj-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/B83M-T7WN].
100. See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 87, at 3 (observing that Goldman Sachs “apparently
reduced its own risk by selling part of its mortgage exposure to its clients and customers”); Protess,
supra note 91 (describing millions Goldman made as a result of the deals).
101. See PARTNOY, supra note 98, at 240–43 (describing lack of supervision of rogue trader who
hid his losses at his employer’s expense).
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CEO, who is characterized as having more autonomy in the operation of
the company, versus the shareholder value era CEO, who is subject to a
greater degree of oversight by corporate boards protecting shareholder
interests.102 This debate, however, involves different issues from the ones
involved in control fraud or predation. To the extent that a CEO uses the
firm as a weapon of predation, she typically does so in ways that increase
reported earnings, boosting share prices and her own compensation.103
This, of course, is exactly what boards who act to promote shareholder
interests want.104 The CEO engaged in control fraud who uses managerial
power to increase the appearance of firm profitability thereby enjoys
greater freedom of action.105 If, instead, the CEO was acting to increase
the honesty of the firm’s operations or to invest more in training or
compensating employees at the expense of the firm’s short-term bottom
line, the board would be more likely to object.106 CEO power, thus,
constitutes “a one way ratchet”; it grows to the extent the CEO uses it to
squeeze customers, creditors, and employees, increasing reported
earnings, but it may diminish if used for other purposes. The shareholder
primacy era increased the opportunities for control fraud for this and other
reasons we discuss below.
B. The Appearance of Legitimacy and Plausible Deniability
All of the seminal work in white-collar criminology emphasizes the
seeming legitimacy of the criminals. Indeed, Al Capone referred to such
crimes as “the legitimate rackets.”107 Sutherland, in defining white-collar
crime in terms of the betrayal of trust, recognized that the appearance of
legitimacy was important to the creation of trust that could be betrayed.108
102. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 564 (2003).
103. See William K. Black & June Carbone, Economic Ideology and the Rise of the Firm as a
Criminal Enterprise, 49 AKRON L. REV. 371, 397 n.155 (2016) (describing CEO compensation is set).
104. Bainbridge, supra note 102.
105. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 295 (2004) (noting that the “preference of the firm’s current shareholders
is for increasing profitability reflected in either dividends or stock price, which sometimes is aided by
concealing the truth rather than revealing it.”); id. at 313 (commenting that if the CEO enjoys a strong
initial run, that “creates greater autonomy by both enhancing his bargaining position over time and
increasing the cognitive commitment of the board to him”).
106. Black & Carbone, supra note 103, at 397 n.155 (observing that CEO power is greater to
effect control fraud than otherwise); see also Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis,
and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 320–21 (2012) (describing how executive
compensation increases emphasis on short-term increases in share price).
107. Sutherland, supra note 21, at 3 (referring to tax, accounting and bankruptcy fraud, bribery,
embezzlement, stock manipulation, and the like).
108. Id.
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Wheeler and Rothman, in describing the organization as a “weapon,”
treated it as a weapon whose power came from its seeming legitimacy.109
Businesses engaged in predation also need to be able to command at
least a measure of trust in order to exploit asymmetries in information. As
Akerlof observed with respect to lemons markets, the disappearance of
trust depresses prices across the entire market.110 Moreover, when
companies like Goldman engage in systematic exploitation of customers,
they often operate near the gray line that separates legal predation from
fraud with uncertainty about the precise location of the dividing line
insulating top executives from individual liability.111 Both objectives—
preserving legitimacy and avoiding liability—involve what some have
called “plausible deniability.”112
Charles Calomiris, a proponent of financial deregulation, used the
term plausible deniability to describe what took place during the financial
crisis.113 He described how at each step in the process of creating risky
mortgage loans, bundling them into securities, and basing derivatives on
the securities, the parties involved in creating and selling them overvalued
the resulting instruments.114 The mortgage originators often encouraged
borrowers to overstate their income. The investment bankers bundling and
selling the mortgages used estimated default rates based on better quality
mortgages.115 The rating agencies gave the securities triple-A ratings
without taking loan quality or poor underwriting practices into account.116
Even as evidence mounted that the market for these instruments was
overvalued, those involved could rely on the stated income, estimated
default rates, and agency ratings to plausibly deny just how overvalued the
instruments were. The system, in fact, worked to defuse individual
accountability for the results—and to keep inflating the housing bubble
well beyond the point where there should have been a market correction.117
Calomiris concluded that:

109. Wheeler & Rothman, supra note 20, at 1426.
110. Akerlof, supra note 5, at 489–90.
111. See Buell, supra note 91, at 545–48 (discussing the elements of securities fraud and the
difficulty of establishing individual liability).
112. See, e.g., William K. Black, The Department of Justice “Chases Mice While Lions Roam
the Campsite”: Why the Department has Failed to Prosecute the Elite Frauds that Drove the Financial
Crisis, 80 UMKC L. REV. 987, 1001–02 (2012).
113. See Charles W. Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and What’s
Next, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2009, at 6, 12.
114. Id. at 13–15.
115. Id. at 13–14 (indicating how default rates were based on the 2001–03 period, an anomalous
period in which housing prices continued to rise despite a recession and loans were generally of better
quality).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 14–15.
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Plausible deniability may have been a coordinating device for
allowing asset managers to participate in the feeding frenzy at little
risk of losing customers (precisely because so many participated).
Because asset managers could point to market-based data, and ratings
at the time as confirming the prudence of their actions on a
forward-looking basis, they were likely to bear little cost from
investor losses.118

Calomiris’s description explains how mortgage brokers, traders
dealing in mortgage-backed securities, derivative originators, and others
engaged in what should have been seen as predatory practices. They
encouraged their customers to invest in products that finance professionals
should have known were overvalued, secure in the belief that they would
be able to profit from the “feeding frenzy” while bearing little
responsibility for investor losses.119
Those engaged in predation often create similar mechanisms within
firms that provide incentives to engage in predatory practices while
allowing senior officers and directors to maintain plausible deniability for
the consequences. Hill and Painter conclude that the ability of institutions
like Goldman to persist in such activities involves not only the type of
“plausible deniability” that Calomiris describes but also the appearance of
success—and of being known as the smartest bankers on Wall Street.120
Control fraud often involves orchestrating prestige within and outside the
firm to facilitate the unscrupulous practices—all while insulating the top
corporate officials from knowledge of the details. In contrast, Ireland,
following its financial crisis, has considered regulatory policies promoting
healthier firm cultures rather than simply greater rule observance; it
considered requiring greater individual accountability that would make it
more difficult for senior officials to escape liability simply by claiming
that they were unaware of wrongful acts by their subordinates.121
C. Performance Pay
One of the biggest changes to accompany the move from the
managerial era to the shareholder value era is the change in executive
compensation.122 Performance pay is an effective way for a CEO to take
118. Id. at 16.
119. Id.
120. HILL & PAINTER, supra note 87, at 102–03 (concluding that Goldman Sachs’s practices of
fleecing its customers did not hurt either the individual trader’s or the bank’s reputation so long as the
behavior was associated with the “smartest” bankers).
121. See Ciaran Walker, The Role of the Regulator in Supervising Culture in Financial Services
Firms, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN IRELAND: LAW AND POLICY 104–05 (Joe McGrath ed. 2018)
(explaining role of firm cultures); id. at 103–04 (discussing individual accountability).
122. See, e.g., O’Kelley, supra note 17, at 1040–46.
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charge of a company and reorient it to emphasize revised management
objectives.123 Performance pay is also a valuable tool in priming corporate
personnel to engage in predatory practices while preserving upper
management’s plausible deniability.124
The ability to use performance pay in this way increased with the
move to shareholder value. During the managerial era, corporate officers
often saw their role as company stewards who derived their individual
prestige from the long-term success and growth of their companies.125
John Kenneth Galbraith observed that, while corporate officers often did
own stock or stock options in their companies, they rarely acted to advance
their own pecuniary interests at the expense of the firm.126 Executives were
expected to collaborate for the greater good of the company, not compete
with each other for a cut of firm profits.127 The CEO’s income, which was
not that much higher than that of other senior management officials, was
substantially lower in relative terms than the CEO’s income today.128 In
this environment, acting on self-interest was not what “a good company
man” did; instead, corporate executives oriented their behavior in
accordance with more holistic company objectives.129
In the shareholder value era, executive compensation changed in two
mutually reinforcing ways that placed greater emphasis on individual
rewards. First, to better align management and shareholder interests, top
management compensation packages began to emphasize incentive pay
tied overwhelmingly to stock options.130 Between 1993 and 2014, the
percentage of CEO compensation attributable to incentive pay increased
from 35% to 85%,131 and CEOs also faced greater risk of dismissal if share
prices did not increase.132 The overall disparities in the pay of top
123. See, e.g., Jack Welch, Jack Welch: ‘Rank-and-Yank’? That’s Not How It’s Done, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/8216rankandyank8217-that8217s-not-how-it8217sdone-1384473281 [https://perma.cc/P236-BAX6] (describing how incentive pay can be used to
incentivize whatever behavior management wishes to encourage).
124. See Black, supra note 112, at 989, 992, 1005, 1015 (describing the role of executive
compensation in control fraud).
125. See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change,
and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305,
323–24 (2013) (noting that this idea of stewardship even had a place in the Harvard Business School’s
conception of the Managerial Role).
126. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 147 (1967).
127. Id. at 147–48.
128. See id. at 138–39; see also O’Kelley, supra note 17, at 1031.
129. GALBRAITH, supra note 126, at 148.
130. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 265, 320–21 (2012).
131. Stout, supra note 50, at 533.
132. Executives also faced greater risk of dismissals if stock earnings did not increase. See
Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive
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executives at the same company increased,133 and between 1981 and 2013,
the pay ratio between CEOs and average wage workers grew from 42:1 to
331:1.134
Complementing the greater emphasis on stock options and earningsrelated bonuses in the top management ranks was a second shift that
emphasized greater use of incentive pay throughout the managerial ranks
in much of corporate America. Performance pay came to apply to
everything from Walmart store managers to used car sales personnel to
mid-level executives to traders like Tourre.135 Jack Welch engineered one
of the early forms of this type of evaluation system at General Electric
(GE) in the 1980s.136 The system involves stack ranking, that is, a
competitive evaluation system in which everyone is compared to everyone
else, with approximately the top twenty percent given outsized bonuses
and groomed for promotion, while the bottom ten percent is at risk of
dismissal. Welch emphasized the need for “differentiation” among
employees and bragged that he could get his employees to do anything
management wanted by building it into the incentive system.137 Enron
embraced the system, and former CEO Jeff Skilling used it to impose his
personal stamp on the company.138 Bonuses could compose the bulk of
employee pay, and every year’s bottom group was threatened with
dismissal.139

Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 695 (2011) (indicating that CEO terminations
can be linked to share price performance).
133. For a discussion of the move toward incentive pay, see MICHAEL DORFF, INDISPENSABLE
AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 79 (2014)
(discussing assumptions that incentives would spur better performance).
134. Lawrence Mishel & Julia Wolfe, CEO Compensation Has Grown 940% since 1978:
Typical Worker Compensation Has Risen Only 12% During That Time, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 14,
2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-2018/ [https://perma.cc/HM4B-KG9F];
CEO-To-Worker Pay Ratio Ballooned 1,000 Percent Since 1950: Report, H UFFINGTON
P OST (May 1, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/ceo-to-worker-payratio_n_3184623.html [https://perma.cc/457Y-U7JN].
135. See, e.g., June Carbone, Naomi Cahn & Nancy Levit, Women, Rule-Breaking, and The
Triple Bind, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
136. See, e.g., PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 51–52
(2002) (describing the pitfalls of Enron’s “rank and yank” performance management system); Nancy
B. Rapoport, “Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using Default Rules and Incentives to Change
Behavior in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 42, 44 n.2 (2014) (“Want
people to turn on their colleagues rather than encourage teamwork? Use a ‘rank and yank’ system that
routinely drops the bottom 10% of high achievers off the payroll.”).
137. Welch, supra note 123.
138. Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More Than
Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243, 251 (2003) (describing the role of incentive pay at Enron).
139. While rank and yank did not apply to CEOs, they were not immune from threats of dismissal
under the new shareholder value system. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 132, at 695 (indicating that
CEO terminations can be linked to share price performance).
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Postmortems at Enron describe performance pay as a major factor in
the creation of the company’s culture. Former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling
“perpetuated a focus on short-term transactional endeavors from the very
beginning by hiring employees that embodied the beliefs that he was trying
to instill: aggressiveness, greed, a will to win at all costs, and an
appreciation for circumventing the rules.”140 The behavior did not just
involve workplace conduct—“Divorce rates among senior executives
were skyrocketing as well.”141 These results reflected an emphasis on
“[i]nstant gratification, both personally and professionally.”142
Incentive pay makes it much easier to prime an organization for
predation—or other kinds of fraud—while preserving management’s
plausible deniability. All the CEO has to do is emphasize, as Jack Welch
did, “hitting the numbers,” while not inquiring too closely into the methods
used to produce results.143 In Welch’s case, hitting the numbers ordinarily
meant beating earnings estimates. During Welch’s tenure, GE’s revenue
grew 385%, while the company’s stock market value rose 4,000%.144
Welch beat the estimates almost every quarter for two decades,145 and GE
faced a major securities fraud investigation once he left.146 At Enron and
other places, the result was “a win-at-all costs mentality, and a willingness
to cross the ethical line.”147
In the years since its adoption at GE, incentive pay has been
associated with opportunistic and predatory behavior and, even in some
cases, illegal actions “including earning manipulations, accounting frauds,
and excessive risk-taking.”148 Some of the most striking examples of the
use of bonus pay come from the financial sector. At Citigroup, for
example, in the run up to the financial crisis, employee bonuses were tied
to revenue generation; the bonuses either understated risk or did not factor

140. Sims & Brinkmann, supra note 138, at 251.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1188 (2005) (describing this process).
144. Barry Ritholtz, Judging GE’s Jeff Immelt Versus Jack Welch, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-12/judging-ge-s-jeff-immelt-versus-jack-welch
[https://perma.cc/RK4M-LUJA].
145. ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM CAN
LEARN FROM THE NFL 97 (2011) (describing how Welch beat earnings expectations an extraordinary
96% of the time).
146. See also David P. Bergers, SEC Charges General Electric with Accounting Fraud: GE
Agrees to Pay $50 Million to Settle SEC’s Charges, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 4,
2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-178.htm [https://perma.cc/DP7K-W9K2].
147. Sims & Brinkmann, supra note 138, at 252.
148. Stout, supra note 50, at 534; see also Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Budgeting Is Broken—
Let’s Fix It, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2001, at 94.
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it in at all.149 William Dudley, former President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, concluded, “High-powered pay incentives linked to
short-term profits, combined with a flexible and fluid job market,
have . . . contributed to a lessening of firm loyalty—and, sometimes, to a
disregard for the law—in an effort to generate larger bonuses.”150
High stakes bonus cultures make it easy to prime a corporation for
predation in reinforcing ways. First, they change the nature of the people
attracted to the organization.151 Lynn Stout emphasizes that it is reasonable
to expect “employers who rely on incentives to attract more than their
share of opportunistic employees” only because employees willing to cut
corners may see greater opportunities to profit from such environments.152
Second, creating a work environment that attracts the unscrupulous tends
to drive out others, creating the type of Gresham’s dynamic that Akerlof
describes in the used car industry. Stout explains that “once a workplace
begins to attract more than its share of relatively opportunistic or unethical
employees, . . . it will also begin to repel the relatively prosocial and to
subvert the prosocial employees who remain at the firm into committing
their own ethical lapses.”153 Those who thrive in such environments tend
to be simultaneously competitive and loyal, which requires a degree of
“ethical plasticity”—that is, the ability “to construe what is self-serving to
be reasonable, so that moral anxiety is buffered.”154 In addition, such
companies often reward the unscrupulous, who quickly adapt to changing
firm expectations without much resistance or guilt.155 Third, such an
environment tends to normalize predatory behavior. Donald Langevoort
observes that “corruption is usually a lengthy slide down a slippery slope,
as small transgressions grow larger and larger without being checked early
149. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory Failures,
47 IND. L. REV. 69, 116 (2014) (observing that Citi’s CEO testified that “[t]he compensation structure
on Wall Street is one that many people have criticized over the years. It is for traders, for bankers and
so forth, a compensation model that is based on revenue growth, not even profit growth” and that the
compensation system contributed to the financial crisis).
150. William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Remarks at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry:
Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20,
2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html [https://perma.cc/
UDE2-983B].
151. See Jeffrey A. Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Competitive Workplaces Deter
Female Workers? A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment on Job Entry Decisions, 82 REV. ECON.
STUD. 122 (2015) (finding that men were 94% more likely than women to apply for a job if its salary
potential was described as being highly dependent on competition with other employees).
152. Stout, supra note 50, at 555.
153. Id. at 556.
154. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 970 (2002).
155. Id.
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enough either by external sanction or internal governance.”156 He
concludes that at the outset, many participants would report their
commitment to ethical conduct. After taking small initial ethically dubious
actions, however, they become more likely to take larger ones, including
the kinds of actions they would have opposed at the outset.157 They also
become more likely to rationalize their behavior as acceptable.
Criminologists describe this thinking as “neutralization” techniques.158
Competitive pay makes all these factors easier to manipulate.159 The
CEO determines the objectives that influences bonuses.160 These
objectives often involve “meeting the numbers” without much regard to
the process of getting there. Walmart, for example, fairly rigidly
determines manager pay in accordance with a formula that takes total sales
and divides it by labor costs.161 Supervisors who succeed in suppressing
labor costs do not experience much scrutiny.162 Those who look out for
their employees risk losing their jobs.163 The result contributes to labor
practices that have made Walmart number one in the country for wage
theft,164 generating over $200 million in fines in 2016 alone.165 And,
156. Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 954 (2017).
157. Id.; see also Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in
Organizations, 25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1 (2003); Darley, supra note 143, at 1185–87
(process of “entrapment”); Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Executive Overconfidence
and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 311, 313 (2012) (presenting
evidence of innocent, overconfident first steps that eventually lead to violations of law).
158. See Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3143,
3164 (2014) (describing neutralization techniques as particularly important in white collar crime
because of the greater education and sophistication of the offenders); Shadd Maruna & Heith
Copes, What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?, 32 CRIME & JUST.
221, 242 (2005) (observing that “offending is partially facilitated by a cognitive mindset that justifies
and rationalizes criminal behavior”).
159. See FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 136.
160. Welch, supra note 123.
161. See Steve Symington, What Sam Walton Would Say About Walmart’s New Minimum Wage,
MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 28, 2015), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/03/28/what-samwalton-would-have-to-say-about-walmarts-m.aspx [https://perma.cc/W6Y8-W5QA] (describing how
Walton sought to align store manager and management incentives from the early days of the company).
162. Hamilton Nolan, A Walmart Manager Describes Walmart’s Mismanagement, GAWKER
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://gawker.com/a-walmart-manager-describes-walmarts-mismanagement-1625
530679 [https://perma.cc/7LJT-2TED] (A manager reported in 2014 that “I’ve often had to cut
associates [sic] hours in order to ensure that all of the salaried managers would receive our annual
bonuses.”).
163. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL REVOLUTION 58 (2009).
164. PHILIP MATTERA, GOOD JOBS FIRST & JOBS WITH JUSTICE EDUCATION FUND, GRAND
THEFT PAYCHECK: THE LARGE CORPORATIONS SHORTCHANGING THEIR WORKERS’ WAGES 8 (2018),
https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdfs/wagetheft_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z
WK-2SUA].
165. Lauren Weber, Bank Pays Out Some of the Biggest Settlements in Wage Disputes, WALL
ST. J. (June 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-pay-out-some-of-the-biggest-settlementsin-wage-disputes-1528189200 [https://perma.cc/V3RQ-TBF7].
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Walmart’s upper management can plausibly claim that it does not know
about the individual practices that produce the wages and hours violations.
In the meantime, management marginalizes dissenters by ranking them
below par, and in competitive environments, they are soon gone.
The managers who participate in this behavior may also identify
more with each other and less with the employees that they are
shortchanging, similar to how Goldman traders came to view their
customers as marks.166 Lynne Dallas reports that competitive
environments, despite their claim to merit, produce more politicized
decision-making.167 Walmart, for instance, did not post managerial
openings. Instead, existing managers identified the employees thought
suitable for promotion and invited them to apply.168 These informal
practices helped ensure that those selected would have the right mindset
about the need to keep bonuses high and labor costs low without calling
undue attention to Walmart’s methods.
D. Shareholder Value and Short-termism
The move to shareholder value involves a shift not just from the
interests of multiple corporate stakeholders to those of shareholders alone,
but also from long-term to short-term shareholder interests.169
Performance pay, in turn, is linked to metrics that produce short-term
increases in share price,170 with activist investors ready to challenge
corporate management if they believe the corporation is undervalued.171
The focus on short-term fluctuations in share price, like performance pay,
has a series of overlapping effects that makes predation more likely.172

166. Nolan, supra note 162.
167. Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their
Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J.
1, 37 (2003) (describing how Enron management used its bonus system to reorient company behavior
in counterproductive and unethical ways).
168. NICHOLAS COPELAND & CHRISTINE LABUSKI, THE WORLD OF WAL-MART: DISCOUNTING
THE AMERICAN DREAM 58 (2013).
169. Dallas, supra note 130, at 321.
170. Id. at 272 n.40.
171. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism
by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75, 80–82 (2011) (noting that a high percentage of publicly traded
companies experience pressure to increase short term earnings because of the role of hedge funds and
other activist investors).
172. Indeed, Michael Jensen, an early proponent of incentive pay, later recanted. See Michael C.
Jensen, Paying People to Lie: The Truth About the Budgeting Process, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 379, 379–
80 (2003) (observing that using budgets or targets in organizations’ performance measurement and
compensation systems has encouraged gaming the system).
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First, the emphasis on producing short-term results tends to shorten
CEO and other executive tenure.173 That, in turn, creates even greater
pressure to produce immediate results.174 The results—and the
corresponding CEO bonus pay—become ends in themselves, defining
success and determining status.175 The process encourages selection of
narcissistic and overconfident CEOs determined to do whatever it takes to
reorient the company to produce an immediate increase in profits.176
Second, with shorter tenures, CEOs tend to focus on actions that can
have an immediate impact, even if this weakens the firm’s long-term
prospects. The savings and loan crisis in the 1980s involved business
strategies guaranteed to bankrupt the thrifts—while making their owners
incredibly rich in the process. As economists Akerlof and Romer noted,
“[I]f the owners can extract more than the true economic value of the thrift,
owners with a positive net worth will voluntarily choose to go bankrupt by
extracting resources from it.”177 In other words, even the owners of
otherwise profitable companies (those with a positive net worth) would
chose to invest in enterprises with “a negative net present value”178 if by
doing so they could justify “looting” their own firms.179 The more common
examples of this involve a different kind of sleight of hand—the increase
in share prices that benefits top management and short-term investors at
the expense of those with longer time horizons. A 2005 survey of 401
financial executives, for example, reported that seventy-eight of them
would take actions that lowered the value of their companies to create a
smooth earnings stream.180 Another study of executives in other industries
found that the firms increased reported earnings by cutting support for
research and development and marketing, even where such practices did

173. See, e.g., RICK WARTZMAN, THE END OF LOYALTY: THE RISE AND FALL OF GOOD JOBS IN
AMERICA 312 (2017) (documenting decline in worker tenure and loyalty); Matthew J. Bidwell, What
Happened to Long-Term Employment? The Role of Worker Power and Environmental Turbulence in
Explaining Declines in Worker Tenure, 24 ORG. SCI. 1061, 1063–67 (2013) (describing changes in
job expectations).
174. Rakesh Khurana, The Curse of the Superstar CEO, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2002, at 60, 62.
175. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance,
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 718 (2005) (observing that CEOs see
large compensation packages as self-validating).
176. See, e.g., Charles A. O’Reilly III et al., Narcissistic CEOs and Executive Compensation, 25
LEADERSHIP Q. 218, 218 (2013) (describing narcissists as more likely to be “inspirational, [to] succeed
in situations that call for change, and be a force for creativity”).
177. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy
for Profit, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, 1993, at 1, 10.
178. Id.
179. That is, “extracting more than the true economic value of the thrift.” Id. at 11.
180. See John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, Value Destruction and
Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 33 (2006).
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not advance the firms’ medium- to longer-term interests.181 Others firms,
experiencing pressure to manipulate earnings, have engaged in outright
fraud.182
Third, it may persuade CEOs to adopt predatory practices that
produce an immediate boost to earnings at the expense of other
stakeholders183—or the company’s long-term reputation or profitability.
Goldman arguably did exactly that when it sought to unload
mortgage-backed securities at its customers’ expense as it realized that the
housing market was about to tank in the run-up to the financial crisis.184
So did Citigroup as it emphasized revenue growth without taking risk into
account.185 Art Wilmarth describes how traders even had a term for the
mindset: “IBGYBG, ‘I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.’ It referred to deals that
brought in big fees up front while risking large losses in the future.”186
The emphasis on shareholder value, implemented through practices
that focus intensely on short-term results, increases the likelihood that
CEOs will create environments that encourage predation. A Commission
examining these issues in the wake of the Enron and World.com scandals
found that: “In sum, executive compensation has become too ‘de-linked’
from long-term performance goals in many corporations. There is an
imbalance between unprecedented levels of executive compensation, with
little apparent financial downside risk or relationship of this compensation
to long-term company performance.”187 After all, executives like Welch
and hedge fund activists who join corporate boards to force short-term

181. See Dallas, supra note 106, at 280.
182. See, e.g., Sharon Hannes & Avraham Tabbach, Executive Stock Options: The Effects of
Manipulation on Risk Taking, 38 J. CORP. L. 533, 542–43 (2013) (discussing the link between
executive incentive compensation, excessive risk taking, and the current financial crisis); Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002) (examining Enron’s ability to use the appearance of profitability to
boost share price and concluding that the “accounting profession seems not to have adjusted to the
transition from professional to profit-maximization norms”).
183. See Ribstein, supra note 182, at 9 (observing how the ability to create the appearance of
profitability benefitted Enron).
184. See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 87, at 3 (observing that Goldman Sachs “apparently
reduced its own risk by selling part of its mortgage exposure to its clients and customers”); Protess,
supra note 91 (describing millions Goldman made as a result of the deals); Lucinda Shen, Goldman
Finally Admits it Defrauded Investors During the Financial Crisis, FORTUNE (Apr. 11, 2016), http://
fortune.com/2016/04/11/goldman-sachs-doj-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/T32D-7MK5].
185. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 149, at 116.
186. Id. at 137 n.386.
187. THE CONFERENCE BD., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2002), https://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/SR-03-04ES.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ88-Z2DR].
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boosts in earnings can keep their riches even if the company and its
reputation suffer once they are gone.188
E. The Negative Impact on Managerial Selection
The selection not just of CEOs but of midlevel managers in corporate
America should be something of a mystery. Extensive management
literature identifies that the most effective managers are those with
transformational, rather than transactional, leadership styles that are
attentive to employee cohesion and morale.189 Yet, the emphasis on “bold”
leadership, bottom-line transactional measures of merit, and zero-sum
competitive pay and evaluation systems tend to produce managers who are
less effective across a number of measures. Lynne Dallas concluded that
systems that use rankings to justify large disparities in compensation tend
to produce greater emphasis on self-interest, higher levels of distrust that
undermine teamwork, greater homogeneity in the selection of corporate
management, less managerial accountability, and more politicized
decision-making.190 Kurt Eichenwald, in an in-depth study of what went
wrong at Microsoft during Steve Ballmer’s tenure, attributed the
company’s “lost decade” to its competitive evaluation system.191
These negative assessments of competitive compensation systems
began with the literature taking stock of corporate America in the wake of
the Enron scandals. Ribstein concluded that the “rank and yank” era had
produced a “new breed”:
These executives are hyper-motivated survivors of a highly
competitive tournament . . . who have proven their ability to make
money while putting on a veneer of loyalty to the firm. At least some
of the new breed appear to be Machiavellian, narcissistic,
prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and
moral distractions, willing to take great risk as the company moves
188. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (arguing that executive ability to set
compensation facilitates the ability to benefit from short term and “rent extraction” strategies); James
B. Stewart, Did the Jack Welch Model Sow Seeds of G.E.’s Decline?, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/business/ge-jack-welch-immelt.html?r=0 [https://perma.cc/3Z
U8-XKDR] (discussing Welch’s role in GE’s decline).
189. See Alice H. Eagly, Women as Leaders: Leadership Style Versus Leaders’ Values and
Attitudes, HARV. BUS. SCH. SYMP., GENDER & WORK: CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
(2013), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/2013-w50-research-symposium/Documents/eagly
.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCJ9-G53Z] (describing meta-data analysis showing that female managers are
more transformational than male managers and that transformational styles tend to be more effective).
190. Dallas, supra note 167, at 37.
191. Kurt Eichenwald, Microsoft’s Lost Decade, VANITY FAIR (July 24, 2012), http://www.
vanityfair.com/news/business/2012/08/microsoft-lost-mojo-steve-ballmer [https://perma.cc/6PA4EXQH].
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up and to lie when things turn bad, and nurtured by a corporate culture
that instills loyalty to insiders, obsession with short-term stock price,
and intense distrust of outsiders.192

Ribstein suggested that this new breed did not have the commitment to
“ethical custom” to which Friedman referred, and that the Enron-era
scandals further suggested the securities markets did not effectively police
corporate misfeasance, particularly efforts to misstate earnings and
company health.193
In the years since, the rank and yank evaluation system thought
responsible for some of the excesses has declined in popularity,194 but most
companies have simply abandoned the “yank” part of the system while
keeping high stakes bonus systems at the upper end of the curve.195
However, “hypercompetition” corresponds to the overrepresentation in the
managerial ranks of executives who lack empathy or remorse.196 As
Donald Langevoort observes, “[T]raits such as over-optimism, an inflated
sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception
are favored in corporate promotion tournaments.”197 They “are survival
traits, not weaknesses, in a very Darwinian business world.”198 If these
pathological traits are “Darwinian,” it follows that traits such as “a
capacity for ethical self-deception” are “fitter” for firms who value and
reward unethical behavior.
Management psychologists, however, emphasize that a different set
of characteristics is associated with the most effective leaders. In the early
2000s, researchers revised the big five personality characteristics to
include a new one, the “H factor.” The “H” stands for “honesty-humility,”
and it measures sincerity, modesty, and fair-mindedness—traits that stand
in opposition to greed, deceitfulness, pomposity, and rule-breaking.199
Researchers find that those who rank low in the H factor are much more
192. Ribstein, supra note 182, at 9.
193. See id. at 7–9 (describing the executives as “unconstrained by the traditional devices” and
the result as market failure).
194. See, e.g., Max Nisen, Why Stack Ranking Is a Terrible Way to Motivate Employees, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/stack-ranking-employees-is-a-bad-idea2013-11 [https://perma.cc/G3GN-D5YB] (observing that while 49% of companies reported that they
used “stack ranking systems in 2009, . . . by 2011, only 14% used them”).
195. Id.
196. Renee M. Jones, The Irrational Actor in the CEO Suite: Implications for Corporate
Governance, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 713, 744 (2017) (describing overrepresentation of psychopaths,
narcissists, and others lacking empathy and the capacity for remorse).
197. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 288.
198. Id.
199. Michael C. Ashton & Kibeom Lee, The HEXACO Model of Personality Structure and the
Importance of the H Factor, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 1952, 1952 (2008)
(explaining the “Conscientiousness” factor considered some aspects of these, but not in the rulebreaking extremes).
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willing than those with high levels to engage in unethical business
practices.200 They also find that the executives who rate high in the H
factor have compensation packages that are closer to standard employee
pay—the opposite of the narcissists who tend to flourish in the corporate
tournament.201
These findings suggest that the traits that characterize modern
corporate leadership have not just changed but have changed in ways that
are counterproductive to the company’s long-term prospects. The results
may reflect the shift from a focus on long-term effectiveness to short-term
results, and from long-term company health to the interests of managers
and investors more focused on immediate benefits for themselves. A new
CEO, for example, chosen on the basis of his promises to produce an
immediate turnaround, may use competitive evaluation systems to select
for employees who will be loyal to him, and who will push through to get
results in the face of ethical or legal constraints.202 These considerations
may be that much greater if the CEO is selecting managers who will
implement unspoken management objectives. Consider Michael Cohen’s
response when the Congressional committee asked if Donald Trump had
told him to engage in certain legally and ethically questionable activities,
such as lying to Congress.203 Cohen’s response was that Trump did not
need to ask him to do so directly; rather, Trump made clear what he wanted
in other ways, and Cohen understood that his role in the Trump
organization required the ability to decipher Trump’s intentions and
implement them without being asked to do so directly.204 Having
underlings who will do a CEO’s bidding without express instruction is
particularly important if the CEO is eager to preserve the appearance of
legitimacy—and plausible deniability.
Corporations that select for charismatic CEOs who employ
competitive bonus systems to push through transformations and focus
attention on short-term results are, of course, not all engaged in fraud or
200. See, e.g., Kibeom Lee et al., Predicting Integrity with the HEXACO Personality Model: Use
of Self- and Observer Reports, 81 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 147, 147 (2008).
201. See, e.g., Amy Y. Ou, David A. Waldman & Suzanne J. Peterson, Do Humble CEOs
Matter? An Examination of CEO Humility and Firm Outcomes, 44 J. MGMT. 1147, 1147 (2018)
(examining the firm performance of 105 computer software and hardware companies and confirming
that greater humility of CEOs was negatively related to pay disparities).
202. See, e.g., Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable
Cons, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2004, at 98 (arguing that narcissism is overall a plus in business
leadership as it contributes to the ability to “push through massive transformations[,]” but that
narcissists are likely to surround themselves with “yes men” loyal to them).
203. See, e.g., Emma Loop, “In His Way, He Was Telling Me To Lie”: Michael Cohen Testified
On Trump Moscow Cover-Up, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/emmaloop/cohen-trump-congress-testimony [https://perma.cc/YY3J-UXCQ].
204. See id.
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predation. But with the normalization of these practices, corporations are
primed to implement business models that do involve such activities. The
executives encouraging predation do not necessarily act in unusual ways,
nor do they adopt unusual methods. These executives are not easily
detectable to those outside of the business itself and further normalize the
predation. This very normalization, however, makes it unlikely that
“ethical custom” or the market will police unacceptable practices.
In addition, during this same period, what we have referred to
elsewhere as the “Three D’s”—Decriminalization, Deregulation, and
Desupervision—contribute to an environment that increases corporate
ability to exploit “gray areas” of uncertain legality or enforceability.205 The
result resembles what economist Frédéric Bastiat described in the
eighteenth century when he observed that “[w]hen plunder becomes a way
of life for a group of men in a society, over the course of time they create
for themselves a legal system that authorizes it and a moral code that
glorifies it.”206
F. When Plunder Becomes a Way of Life
The factors criminologists emphasize in explaining white-collar
crime—the tone set at the top, the use of the corporation to promote the
appearance of legitimacy, the role of incentives in priming corporate
behavior, and the ability to exploit asymmetries in information and power
to the disadvantage of shareholders, customers, and employees—are not
new. All existed during the eras that influenced Berle, Sutherland, and
Wheeler. What has changed is the role of the shareholder value model and
modern executive compensation in systematizing these elements across a
broader swath of corporate America and the changing legal infrastructure
that reduces individual accountability for the results. Both changes
contribute to the construction of corporate cultures established to facilitate
predation.
To illustrate the combination of short-termism and legal impunity,
consider two predatory business models made possible by the weakening
of the oversight that once kept such activities in check. Start with finance.
In Infectious Greed, Frank Partnoy explained that three major changes
have remade finance since the mid-1980s in ways Bastiat might have
205. See Black, supra note 112, at 993 (referring to deregulation, desupervision, and
decriminalization). “Desupervision” refers to the failure to supervise financial institutions, but in other
arenas, it can refer to the effective failure of federal and state agencies to oversee the enforcement of
the law. See, e.g., Tosh Anderson, Overwork Robs Workers’ Health: Interpreting OSHA’s General
Duty Clause to Prohibit Long Work Hours, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 85, 102 n.62 (2004) (describing
similar process with respect to worker protections).
206. Frédéric Bastiat Quotes, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/6862167-when
-plunder-becomes-a-way-of-life-for-a-group [https://perma.cc/K8MX-FJE7].
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predicted. First, “financial instruments became increasingly complex and
were pushed underground, as more parties used financial engineering to
manipulate earnings and to avoid regulation.”207 In short, opportunities for
exploiting asymmetric information increased both the ability to engage in
predatory behavior and to evade accountability. Second, “control and
ownership of companies moved greater distances apart,”208 increasing
management’s ability to take advantage of shareholders and its difficulty
in supervising employees, for better and ill.209 This change in corporate
management has increased the degree of plausible deniability, insulating
senior executives from accountability. Third, “markets were deregulated,
and prosecutors rarely punished financial malfeasance.”210 That is, as
Bastiat suggested, the legal system increasingly tolerated predatory
behavior211 and, as Hill and Painter explain, the ability to be seen as the
smartest bankers on Wall Street brought glory rather than opprobrium.212
By the time of the financial crisis, the bankers had become “too big to
jail.”213 Plausible deniability and the routinization of predatory practices
meant that, while many were complicit, no one was accountable.
A second example involves predation on employees. Walmart has
long been the poster child for wage theft, having been penalized more for
cheating its workers than any other company in the country.214 Given
chronic understaffing, company policy against paying overtime, and
bonuses tied to the suppression of labor costs, some managers pressure
workers to clock out and then go back to work or to continue working
through breaks or lunch hours without giving the employees credit for the
extra work.215 Other managers simply “adjust” the time cards of workers
who report more than forty hours in a week, unilaterally adding rest breaks

207. PARTNOY, supra note 98, at 3.
208. Id.
209. Compare id. at 177–84 (describing a trader fleecing GE), with id. at 12–17 (describing a
trader running trades that worked to the benefit of Banker’s Trust).
210. Id. at 4.
211. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in Destroying a
Bureaucracy from Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
04/16/magazine/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/6S2P-6A7P]
(describing efforts to undermine the Bureau’s efforts to regulate financial predation).
212. See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 87.
213. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenstern, A Bank Too Big to Jail, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/business/a-bank-too-big-to-jail.html [https://perma.cc/96MKVP3N].
214. See MATTERA, supra note 164.
215. See Stephen Halebsky, The Retail Revolution, 27 SOC. F. 255, 255–57 (2012) (reviewing
NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL REVOLUTION (2010)).
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or increasing meal periods.216 These activities violate wage and hour laws
and deprive employees of compensation owed for hours worked. Between
2000 and 2014, Walmart spent over $80 million on lobbying and campaign
contributions,217 donating to 295 different candidates in one election year
alone. These contributions have contributed to a political willingness to
gut wages and hours protection. Congressional Republicans, for example,
have unanimously voted against minimum wage increases in recent
Congresses, despite 78% public support for a higher rate, contributing to
the erosion of the value of the minimum wage.218 The beneficiaries of these
contributions, which include the Bush family, have appointed union
hostile labor regulators. Indeed, President George W. Bush dismissed the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) General Counsel only days
before he was to argue a major case against Walmart. The successor Bush
nominated dropped the case, despite extensive evidence of Walmart’s use
of illegal tactics in fighting unionization of its stores during the
unionization campaign in the late 1990s.219 Since then, both Trump
appointees and conservative Supreme Court appointees220 have further
undercut labor enforcement.221
Deregulation and weak enforcement have contributed to a
company’s ability to maintain the seeming legitimacy of its practices while
cloaking the improprieties from view. The combination of a management
ethos that encourages a predatory mindset and a public ethos that
normalizes it makes it easier, as Akerlof and Shiller have claimed, for
216. See Brad Seligman, Patriarchy at the Checkout Counter: The Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., Class Action Suit, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 231
(Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006).
217. Catherine Ruetschlin, How Walmart and Home Depot are Buying Huge Political Influence,
AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 3, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/how-walmart-and-home-depot-are-buyinghuge-political-influence [https://perma.cc/2DHH-LSHR].
218. See Jillian Berman, Walmart PAC, Walton Family Political Contributions Favor
Conservatives: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
06/18/walmart-political-contributions_n_3461267.html [https://perma.cc/K2BU-5XNQ]; Ruetschlin,
supra note 217.
219. Misha Petrovic & Gary G. Hamilton, Making Global Markets: Wal-Mart and Its Suppliers,
in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 107 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed.,
2006), 136–37, 142–43 (describing incident).
220. See Jeffry Bartash, Trump Set to Make Supreme Court Even More Pro-Business with
Kavanaugh Pick, MKT. WATCH (July 9, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/business-arewinning-big-at-the-supreme-court-a-new-trump-pick-means-theyll-keep-winning-2018-07-09 [https:
//perma.cc/E56U-JF75]; see also Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business
Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1449 (2013).
221. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (five-four decision upholding
mandatory arbitration provisions that make challenges to predatory labor decisions more difficult);
Danny Feingold, Walmart’s War Against Unions — and the U.S. Laws That Make It Possible,
H UFF P OST (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/walmart-labor-laws_b_3390994 [https
://perma.cc/F7GV-J2GA].
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companies to profit from predatory practices. Overall, this reinforces the
image of these companies as successful and further spurs the internal
competitions for promotions and bonuses, creating predatory, if not
always criminogenic, corporate cultures.
III. PREDATION, GENDER, AND WOMEN AS THE
CANARIES IN THE COAL MINE
The gendered wage gap shrank over the course of the 1970s and
1980s,222 but in the 1990s, something began to change. In 1990, the gender
wage gap had little relationship to education levels.223 To the extent that
there were differences, women with college degrees earned a higher
percentage of the wage for comparably educated men than did
less-educated women.224 Over the next twenty years, while the overall
gender gap in wages continued to shrink, it increased for college
graduates.225 The overall numbers cloaked the fact that, by 2010,
college-educated women were making a smaller share of the male wage
than they had in 1990.226 What happened?
The answer is that income inequality grew dramatically in the United
States, and in the areas where income grew the most—particularly finance,
tech, and the top corporate ranks—women lost ground.227 The percentage
of women on Wall Street and in tech jobs declined after the 1990s, and the
six job categories with the greatest gender gaps in compensation were all
in finance.228 In short, women fell behind in the sectors of the economy
where incentive pay—and opportunities for predation—took hold. These
also happened to be the sectors of the economy enjoying the greatest
overall income growth. During the same period, however, companies with
222. See Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 749–50 (2002).
223. See June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a
New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 872 (2011) (documenting a shift in the gendered
wage gap).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., ELISE GOULD, JESSICA SCHIEDER & KATHLEEN GEIER, ECON. POL’Y INST., WHAT
IS THE GENDER PAY GAP AND IS IT REAL? 10 (2016), https://www.epi.org/publication/what-is-thegender-pay-gap-and-is-it-real/ [https://perma.cc/85F9-VMNM] (finding that, controlling for a broader
range of factors, such as education and hours worked, the extent to which men have outpaced women
has been particularly dramatic for those with earnings above the 90% income percentile).
228. See Frank Bass, Shining Shoes Best Way Wall Street Women Outearn Men, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-16/shining-shoes-bestway-wall-street-women-outearn-men [https://perma.cc/4XA2-7F6X]; see also Derek Thompson, Why
the Gender-Pay Gap Is Largest for the Highest-Paying Jobs, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-sticky-floor-why-the-gender-wage-gap-islowest-for-the-worst-paying-jobs/383863/ [https://perma.cc/GJ34-W6SV].
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greater gender diversity outperformed other companies. A study of almost
22,000 companies reported that businesses with more equal gender
leadership have a “15 percent boost to profitability.”229 Empirical studies
further suggest corporate boards that include more women appear to
produce better results, and women-run funds outperform those run by
men.230 Businesses with greater gender diversity appear to operate in
different ways, with different values, and with better results than more
homogeneous firms.
In this Part, we will first explore how gender theory postulates that
the shareholder value and competitive pay era have produced “masculinity
contest cultures” in which employees compete to demonstrate the most
masculine traits. These cultures make winning at all cost the test of
success, and tolerate self-interested, unethical, and counterproductive
behavior. These cultures also tend to increase workplace bullying, sexual
harassment, and inattention to morale, which drives women from the
workplaces, further reinforcing male dominance in such cultures. Second,
we will consider how these traits align greater male domination with
predatory cultures. Third, we explain how these practices constitute a
triple bind for women: they cannot win if they do not engage in the same
unethical behavior as men, they are punished more severely when they do
engage in the same behavior, and they become less likely to apply when
they see the women ahead of them fail to succeed. Finally, we will
conclude that anti-discrimination efforts are not well-suited to address the
gender disparities, partly because they tend to assume the legitimacy of
business objectives and methods and partly because they depend on
comparisons in the treatment of like workers in workplaces that
increasingly treat all management-level employees on an individual basis.
The result is that the same factors that encourage predation also tend to
exacerbate gender disparities in the workplace, making women canaries in
the coal mine for toxic workplace cultures.

229. Marcus Noland, Tyler Moran & Barbara Kotschwar, Is Gender Diversity Profitable?
Evidence from a Global Survey 8–9 (Peterson Inst. For Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 16-3, 2016),
https://piie.com/publications/wp/wp16-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/73YH-LBN9]; see also Aimee Picchi,
In Business, More Women at the Top Means More Profits, CBS NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-women-more-profits/ [https://perma.cc/R4HZ-FKVG].
230. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89
N.C. L. REV. 855, 864 (2011) (discussing the difference between the business case and moral case for
diversity on corporate boards); Yaron G. Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in
Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145 (2019); Eric McWhinnie, Women Are Mostly Better Investors Than
Men, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/
2014/03/09/women-better-investors-than-men/6176601/ [https://perma.cc/3RK7-4G45] (observing
that women-run funds tend to do better).
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A. Gender Theory and Masculinity Contest Cultures
Gender theorists have put together a body of empirical work that they
use to identify “masculinity contest cultures.”231 To do so, these theorists
have taken the experience with competitive workplace cultures and
recharacterized it in gendered terms. In the process, they emphasize the
ways that the terms of competition are often artificial and increase male
dominance in the workplace, and that workplaces characterized by these
masculinity contest cultures tend to result in lower morale, greater
willingness to engage in unethical practices, and more sexual harassment
and bullying. Gender theorists characterize such workplaces as
environments where the celebration of extreme masculine traits becomes
an end in itself, defining the workplace ideal in stereotypically male
terms.232 We argue, however, that the promotion of these traits also serves
to refocus workplaces on predatory ends, and therefore may be understood
as something more than simply gender stereotyping or misogyny.
Feminists, of course, have long sought to explore “patriarchy” as the
assertion of male power over women.233 More recently, masculinities
theorists have emphasized that patriarchy is also a system that valorizes
the creation of hierarchies that give men power over other men.234
Competition, uncertainty, and high-stakes rewards increase both the
intensity of the fight and the consequences of ending up at the losing end
of male status hierarchies.235 CEOs who use zero sum bonus systems to
gain control of a company by definition increase competition, and to the
extent that they focus it on short-term metrics, they also increase
uncertainty and insecurity, intensifying the effect.236 This theory suggests
that those in power gain a greater ability to manipulate workplace cultures
by dismantling what had been state-sponsored sources of security and
stability (e.g., union power and labor protections) and standardization of
231. Berdahl et al., supra note 3.
232. See id. at 430.
233. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
174 (1987); Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 599 (2013) (arguing that unwanted
sexual aggression is a form of masculine dominance and that harassment is about power, not desire).
234. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Unequal Terms: Gender, Power and the Recreation of
Hierarchy, 69 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y 189 (2016); see also David Brooks, Opinion, Two Cheers for
Feminism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/opinion/feminismgender-empathy-psychology.html [https://perma.cc/SGT9-Y57A] (“[F]or thousands of years social
thinking has been dominated by men — usually alpha men — who saw life as a place where warriors
and traders went out and competed for wealth and power.”).
235. See, e.g., FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN ET AL., ON THE FRONTLINES (2013) (discussing how
hypermasculinity during conflict results in male dominance power struggles among, and over, men
and women).
236. See Berdahl et al., supra note 3, at 429 (observing that masculinity contests are “most
prevalent—and vicious—in male-dominated occupations where extreme resources (fame, power,
wealth) or precarious resources . . . are at stake . . . .”).
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ethical custom and workplace procedures. Walmart, for example, has long
waged anti-union efforts,237 correctly perceiving that labor unions would
make it more difficult to evade wage and hour laws, and in today’s
workplaces, anti-discrimination protections.238
In contrast, competitive cultures tend to create systems of
personalized, rather than institutionalized power. Employees focus on the
internal contests, which involve prevailing over those in the next cubicles,
rather than working together to best external rivals, such as other
companies.239 These contests then select for stereotypically masculine
traits, which can become ends in themselves.240 “In this zero-sum game,”
the scholars explain, “men compete at work for dominance by showing no
weakness, demonstrating a single-minded focus on professional success,
displaying physical endurance and strength, and engaging in cut-throat
competition.”241
These environments work to the disadvantage of women—and often
the organization—in a variety of ways. First, they typically emphasize
confidence to the point of hubris. Jack Welch, in describing the selection
of his successor, bragged that all of the candidates “thrived on change and
had self-confidence to spare.”242 Yet, in an article entitled Why Do So
Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?, organizational psychologist
Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic observed that “when it comes to leadership,
the only advantage that men have over women . . . is the fact that
manifestations of hubris—often masked as charisma or charm—are
commonly mistaken for leadership potential, and that these occur
much more frequently in men than in women.”243

237. See David Karjanen, The Wal-Mart Effect and the New Face of Capitalism, in WAL-MART:
THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 143, 147–48 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed. 2006)
(quoting John Tate, Walmart’s antiunion lawyer, who declared in 2004: “Labor unions are nothing but
blood-sucking parasites living off the productive labor of people who work for a living”).
238. See Elise Gould & Celine McNicholas, Unions Help Narrow the Gendered Wage Gap,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.epi.org/blog/unions-help-narrow-the-gender-wagegap/ [https://perma.cc/N57P-HW37] (discussing union role in standardizing wages, which tends to
benefit women).
239. See Berdahl et al., supra note 3, at 434 (describing consequences of such competitions).
240. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 85–94 (1995) (describing
the persistence of counterproductive traits in the selection of police officers and attributing it to the
definition of the police officer role in terms of stereotypical masculine traits).
241. Berdahl et al., supra note 3, at 430.
242. JACK WELCH WITH JOHN A. BYRNE, STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 629 (2001).
243. Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-many-incompetent-men [https://
perma.cc/9QBH-ZW27]; see also Adrian Furnham et al., Male Hubris and Female Humility? A
Crosscultural Study of Ratings of Self, Parental, and Sibling Multiple Intelligence in America, Britain,
and Japan, 30 INTELLIGENCE 101 (2001).
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Second, they emphasize the willingness to work long hours, often as
a demonstration of commitment to the job rather than as a reflection of
business needs.244 As high-stakes competitions in the workplace have
increased, hours have also increased, mostly at the top of the income
ladder.245 At mid-century, blue-collar and white-collar workers worked
about the same number of hours,246 while today, the highest earners work
much longer hours than anyone else.247 This emphasis on long hours
disproportionately affects women, given their greater family
responsibilities.248 In addition, the appearance of working long hours may
matter more than productivity; one study found that men were three times
more likely than women to ease up on hours without having it affect their
performance reviews—superiors were more likely to view men rather than
women as dedicated to the job.249
Third, the emphasis on the ability to engage in “cut-throat
competition” bolsters in-group favoritism. Gender theorists emphasize
that competitive environments attract those drawn to the ability to exercise
the type of dominance associated with masculinity displays, but such
environments also involve constant threats to the ability to maintain
favored status.250 These scholars conclude, “The need to repeatedly prove
masculinity can lead men to behave aggressively, embrace risky
behaviors, sexually harass women (or other men), and express
244. See Sarah Green Carmichael, The Research Is Clear: Long Hours Backfire for People and
for Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 19, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/08/the-research-is-clear-longhours-backfire-for-people-and-for-companies [https://perma.cc/SJ7Z-MA8C].
245. See Marianne Bertrand et al., Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the
Financial and Corporate Sectors, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 228, 233 (2010); see also Claire
Cain Miller, Women Did Everything Right. Then Work Got ‘Greedy’, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/upshot/women-long-hours-greedy-professions.html?action=
click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/FXT5-QUZZ].
246. See Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Who Are the Overworked Americans?, 56 REV.
SOC. ECON. 442, 457 (1998) (describing the way that changes in hours worked corresponds with
income inequality).
247. See David R. Francis, Why High Earners Work Longer Hours, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES.,
http://www.nber.org/digest/jul06/w11895.html [https://perma.cc/DQ84-9JFJ].
248. See Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 104 AM. ECON. REV.
1091, 1111–13 (2014).
249. See Neil Irwin, How Some Men Fake an 80-Hour Workweek, and Why It Matters, N.Y.
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (May 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/upshot/how-some-menfake-an-80-hour-workweek-and-why-it-matters.html [https://perma.cc/5Z4N-E4LQ].
250. See, e.g., Greg Bensinger, Uber’s Top Deal Maker Resigns After Misconduct Allegations
Revealed, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-top-dealmaker-cameronpoetzscher-resigns-1540238793 [https://perma.cc/BYH4-6FD8]; Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s
Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/22/technology/uber-workplace-culture.html [https://perma.cc/9JZ3-DAMQ] (describing
how the company deliberately created a “Hobbesian environment . . . , in which workers are
sometimes pitted against one another and where a blind eye is turned to infractions from top
performers”).
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homophobic attitudes, when men feel that their masculinity is
threatened.”251 The masculinities context studies find, specifically, that
such cultures produce abusive managers, more eager to demonstrate their
own success than to encourage workplace harmony or productivity.252
They tend to identify with the workers who have the same traits they see
in themselves, and to exploit others’ weaknesses, leading to the “exclusion
and harassment toward historically disadvantaged groups and men with
resistant masculinities.”253 The very idea of a masculinity contest involves
selection for the traits because they are associated with masculinity rather
than because they are valuable to the task at hand.254 Thus, Mary Anne
Case demonstrated how police departments choose officers for traits such
as aggressiveness, self-assuredness, and reliance on physical strength even
when empirical research suggests that such traits are counterproductive,
and officers with traits more likely to defuse conflict do a better job.255
These types of environments tend to promote those winning the
masculinity contest—that is, those displaying aggressiveness, strength,
endurance, and hubris—and to overlook the downside of these traits,
which includes higher turnover and lower morale.256 Scholars further
report that workers in such environments are more likely to experience
sexual or racial harassment and to report a more sexist workplace
culture.257
The result both reinforces gender stereotyping by identifying the
ideal worker with a male image and creating workforce cultures that drive
out women and other outsiders.258 It also creates an atmosphere easy to
manipulate to produce predation; indeed, that may be why upper
251. Berdahl et al., supra note 3, at 428.
252. See Kenneth Matos et al., Toxic Leadership and the Masculinity Contest Culture: How
“Win or Die” Cultures Breed Abusive Leadership, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 500, 502–03 (2018) (listing four
dimensions, including “Show No Weakness”).
253. Berdahl et al., supra note 3, at 435.
254. See generally Chamorro-Premuzic, supra note 243 (summarizing research literature on
gender differences in selection and performance).
255. See Case, supra note 240, at 85–94 (describing the persistence of counterproductive traits
in the selection of police officers (aggressiveness, self-assuredness and reliance on physical strength)
and attributing it to the definition of the police officer role in terms of stereotypical masculine traits
even when other approaches to policing that emphasize different traits (e.g., the de-escalation of
conflict) are more effective).
256. See Peter Glick et al., Development and Validation of the Masculinity Contest Culture
Scale, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 449, 449 (2018).
257. See id.
258. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 642 (2004); Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau,
Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Towards Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 573 (2002)
(describing how role expectations associated with male leaders undercut women even when they
display the same traits).
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management tolerates the downside of these traits. Moreover, focusing on
the role of these cultures in predation changes the description of the
dynamics involved in creating the culture. Gender theorists describe them
as “zero-sum” contests; if one person “wins,” another necessarily loses.
For the company, however, they are often “negative-sum.” That is, the
form the competition takes may lower overall productivity.259 Such
competitions may harm teamwork and select and promote the worst
officers.260 In addition, while high-stakes corporate tournaments are often
described as “winner-take-all” contests, male CEOs create handpicked
teams and often richly reward the teams that support the CEO’s
predations.261
B. Predation and Masculinities Contests
Predation, almost by definition, involves callousness toward its
targets. Studies of gender differences in leadership, on the other hand, tend
to emphasize greater social awareness and empathy as the traits women
are more likely to bring to management. Yet, more predatory
environments favor managers who lack such qualities, and the result
contributes to gender disparities both in the selection of top management,
as well as women’s promotion and success within such companies.262
Essential to the creation of such cultures is competition that pits
employee against employee.263 Even adopting competitive pay schemes
tends to change the nature of those who apply, attracting overconfident
narcissists264 and depressing women’s applications to a much greater
degree than men’s.265 Granted, women can be narcissists, and both male
and female narcissists like to be the center of attention.266 Nonetheless,
259. See Eichenwald, supra note 191.
260. See id.
261. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 167, at 37 (describing decision-making in such environments
as more politicized).
262. See generally, e.g., Maccoby, supra note 202 (arguing that narcissism is overall a plus in
business leadership as it contributes to the ability to “push through . . . massive transformations” and
to supply the charm necessary to win over the masses); O’Reilly et al., supra note 176, at 218
(describing narcissists as more likely to be “inspirational, succeed in situations that call for change,
and be a force for creativity”).
263. See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s
Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209,
1216 (2011) (discussing relationship between highly aggressive, opportunistic stances toward groups
such as customers, and hypercompetitive industries such as financial services).
264. See, e.g., Lee A. Macenczak et al., Direct and Interactive Effects of Narcissism and Power
on Overconfidence, 91 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 113, 119 (2016) (examining the
links between overconfidence and narcissism).
265. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Flory et al., Do Competitive Workplaces Deter Female Workers? A
Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment on Job Entry Decisions, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 122, 122 (2015).
266. See Emily Grijalva et al., Gender Differences in Narcissism: A Meta-Analytic Review, 141
PSYCHOL. BULL. 261, 264 (2015) (summarizing literature).
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male narcissists are more likely than female narcissists to be attracted to
positions of power and authority, and thus more likely to seek leadership
positions.267 The largest gender differences among narcissists, however,
involve the greater willingness of the men “to exploit others and to believe
that they themselves are special and therefore entitled to privileges.”268 In
short, male narcissists are more willing than female narcissists to demand
greater rewards for themselves and to use greater status to run roughshod
over others to accomplish their objectives.269 Narcissists who think in
these terms tend to view compensation as a measure of merit, to feel that
the compensation they receive is justified, and to use whatever tactics they
have at their disposal to increase their leverage in negotiations.270 A study
of tech firms found that the CEOs whose employees ranked the CEOs
higher in narcissistic traits received “more total direct compensation
(salary, bonus, and stock options), have more money in their total
shareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher)
compensation and the other members of their team.”271 These qualities are
almost exactly the opposite of the humility-honesty factor traits associated
with the most effective leaders.272
These factors create self-reinforcing cycles: a company that wishes
to encourage wage suppression, higher sales based on misinformation or
pressure tactics, or other ethically dubious practices may use incentive pay
to encourage the results.273 Negative-sum workplace incentives, however,
will increase the representation of narcissists and discourage women
generally from applying.274 The male narcissists will use harder tactics in
negotiating pay and be more willing to cut ethical corners to increase their
bonuses—increasing pay disparities.275 At the same time, those who thrive
in such environments tend to be more likely to harass and bully their
employees, particularly women and other outsiders, driving them out and
decreasing workplace diversity. These workplaces then become even more
male dominant—and more willing to engage in predatory practices. The
267. See id.
268. Id. at 280.
269. See id.
270. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 175, at 711–13 (describing those who see high rates of
compensation as indication of professional success or personal self-worth as also likely to see the
actions that produce the compensation as self-validating).
271. O’Reilly et al., supra note 176, at 218.
272. See Annette Susanne Peters et al., Associations Between Dispositional Humility and Social
Relationship Quality, 2 PSYCHOL. 155, 155 (2011) (demonstrating that women are less likely to be
seen as acting in their own self-interest and more likely to be perceived as acting in the interest of
others).
273. See discussion supra notes 155–72 and accompanying text.
274. See discussion infra notes 274–80 and accompanying text.
275. See discussion infra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
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male dominance may be an incidental rather than an intended consequence
of the efforts to incentivize predatory practices.
Let us return, for example, to Walmart and examine how it recruited
a managerial force willing to exploit and shortchange workers. In a
national class action case alleging sex discrimination against Walmart,276
the plaintiffs demonstrated that women made up more than two-thirds of
Walmart’s hourly employees and almost ninety percent of its customer
services managers (an hourly position), but constituted less than twenty
percent of salaried store managers at the time the case was brought.277
Women promoted into the supervisory ranks earned substantially less than
the men.278 Walmart’s informal selection process and insistence that
managers work long and unpredictable hours provide part of the
explanation for the gender disparities.279 Walmart also, however, based a
high percentage of managerial pay on a bonus system, typically fired ten
percent or more of store managers even in good years, and required as a
condition of selection for its managerial trainee program that the
candidates be willing to move.280
Even Sam Walton acknowledged that the requirement “really put
good, smart women at a disadvantage in our company because at that time
they weren’t as free to pick up and move as many men were.”281 The
advantage for Walmart is that managers who move repeatedly do not
develop overly close ties to the employees they supervise, their individual
stores, or the communities in which they live.282 They identify instead with
their status as a successful Walmart manager, which may be particularly
important in a corporate culture that emphasizes the suppression of labor
costs.283 In such a system, self-promotion at the expense of employees and
276. See Seligman, supra note 216, at 231.
277. Id. at 237–39.
278. Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Faces Lawsuit over Sex Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/us/wal-mart-faces-lawsuit-over-sex-discrimination.
html [https://perma.cc/YTF3-5EJ5].
279. See Goldin, supra note 248 (describing impact of long hours on women).
280. Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 759,
759–60 (2013); see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 152 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(finding that store managers moved an average of 3.6 times each after becoming a manager, and the
majority of the moves were to different districts).
281. LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS’
RIGHTS AT WAL-MART 29 (2005).
282. See Seligman, supra note 216, at 96 (describing Walmart’s preference for commitment and
dedication to the company and the job over educational degrees or experience); Naomi Schoenbaum,
Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of Place, 127 YALE L. F. 466 (2017) (“Strong
workplace ties also provide emotional support and care that can contribute to performance. Strong ties
with coworkers even serve as a bulwark against workplace harassment, and can help workers better
cope with harassment or mistreatment if it occurs.”).
283. Langevoort, supra note 263, at 1216 (observing that a “strong in-group versus out-group
cultural orientation can also encourage the maintenance of a highly aggressive, opportunistic stance
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callousness and lack of empathy become a condition of employment for a
managerial force in a constant state of insecurity. This Walmart system
can be (and was) presented as an Arkansas old boys’ club, with trips to
Hooters and the promotion of men over women because of sexstereotyping,284 but it can also be seen as a sophisticated effort to promote
managers willing to engage in wage theft without explicit direction from
Bentonville.
Finance, of course, is even more notorious for its predatory attitudes
toward customers. Frank Partnoy recalled how the bankers he worked with
used to refer to “ripping clients’ faces off,” which meant making high fees
selling the clients something they did not understand.285 The more striking
attitudes, however, may be those of personal financial advisers. Unlike
traders and many investment bankers, personal financial advisers typically
have ongoing relationships with their clients. The desired traits for
financial advising and wealth management include building relationships
and strong communication skills—qualities often associated with
women.286 Yet, relatively few wealth managers are women,287 and
personal financial advisors show the largest gender gaps in compensation
in the entire economy.288 Compensation is an oft-cited reason for the
gender disparities; financial advisors tend to be paid based on “the amount
of assets under management . . . or by commissions on product sales, as
opposed to less tangible outcomes such as client satisfaction.”289
The fee structure together with the relative lack of regulatory
oversight invites predatory behavior—and uses success in exploiting
predation as the measure of workplace success. Critics conclude that “[t]he
regulatory structure for financial advice now tolerates incentives
motivating financial advisors to manipulate and deceive retail

toward outsiders, such as customers and competitors” and that such an attitude is “fairly commonplace
in hypercompetitive industries like retail, financial services, and computer technology”).
284. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 281, at 80–84 (describing deposition testimony about
managers’ trips to Hooters and strip clubs).
285. HILL & PAINTER, supra note 87, at 124.
286. See CERTIFIED FIN. PLANNER BD. OF STANDARDS, INC., MAKING MORE ROOM FOR
WOMEN IN THE FINANCIAL PLANNING PROFESSION (2014), https://www.cfp.net/docs/about-cfpboard/cfp-board_win_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3R6-MRV7].
287. See, e.g., Mindy Diamond, Why Aren’t More Women in Wealth Management?,
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (May 14, 2014), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/careers/whyaren-t-more-women-wealth-management [https://perma.cc/U3EH-2B3V] (estimating that only about
13% are female).
288. See Derek Thompson, Why the Gender-Pay Gap Is Largest for the Highest-Paying Jobs,
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-stickyfloor-why-the-gender-wage-gap-is-lowest-for-the-worst-paying-jobs/383863/ [https://perma.cc/JUG
5-3SPW].
289. CERTIFIED FIN. PLANNER BD. OF STANDARDS, INC., supra note 286, at 21.
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investors.”290 Benjamin Edwards observes more bluntly that
“[c]ommission compensation structures may lead even well-meaning
financial advisors to recommend unwise investments to their clients.”291
Edwards describes the way advisors may persuade clients to purchase
products that offer higher sales commissions or involve greater adviser
involvement tied to higher fees.292 He estimates the losses to ordinary
savers from such conduct at $17 billion per year.293
Perhaps the most egregious recent example of such conduct comes
from Wells Fargo. A former Wells Fargo employee explained that “the
whole foundation of Wells Fargo is cross-sell, cross-sell, cross-sell,”294
which builds in conflicts of interest between advisers and customers. The
bank generated enormous pressure on its employees to persuade customers
to purchase additional Wells Fargo services, particularly services likely to
generate overdraft or other fees.295 Most infamously, Wells Fargo opened
accounts in its customers’ names without their knowledge or
permission.296 While that has presumably stopped, a survey of Wells Fargo
workers in March 2019 indicated that “they remain under heavy pressure
to squeeze extra money out of customers.”297 The New York Times
reported that “[s]ome have witnessed colleagues bending or breaking
internal rules to meet ambitious performance goals.”298 One of the former
Wells Fargo bankers commented, “The analogy I use was that it was like
lions hunting zebras . . . . They would look for the weakest, the ones that
would put up the least resistance.”299 The wealth management unit
responsible for some of the worst abuses is now also subject to an ongoing
sex discrimination case.300 And as we will explain in the next Part, the
gender disparities in attrition are striking.
290. Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 181 (2017).
291. Id. at 183.
292. Id. at 184.
293. Id. at 184 n.12.
294. Jim Nortz, The Anatomy of a Corporate Scandal: Unauthorized Credit Cards, Greasy Cup
Holders and a Surefire Recipe for a Corporate Scandal, ACC DOCKET, Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 72 (“Crossselling” refers to “the bank’s sales approach of offering customers with a checking account many other
types of products – including credit cards, home loans, and lines of credit.”).
295. Id. at 70–71.
296. Id.
297. Emily Flitter & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Says Its Culture Has Changed. Some
Employees Disagree., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/business
/wells-fargo-sales-culture.html [https://perma.cc/84TR-F9HE].
298. Id.
299. Merric R. Kaufman, “Lions Hunting Zebras”: The Wells Fargo Fake Accounts Scandal
and Its Aftermath, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 434, 438 (2017).
300. See Emily Glazer, Whistleblowers Detail Wells Fargo Wealth Management Woes, WALL
ST. J. (July 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whistleblowers-detail-wells-fargo-wealthmanagement-woes-1532707096?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/J5XX-J2TG].
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Masculinities contest cultures tend to attract those who thrive on
competition, value compensation as a measure of self-worth, and enjoy the
ability to assert dominance even at the expense of subordinates and
customers. The selection for these traits favors men over women; it also
makes it easier to prime such cultures for predatory activities.
C. The Triple Bind: Competition, Predation, and Punishment
The conventional discussion of why women are so underrepresented
in fields like finance maintains that women just do not like competition
and disproportionately fail to apply for positions in high stakes
competitive cultures.301 In fact, as we have suggested above, women have
good reason to believe that such cultures will be less supportive for them
personally. In addition, if the cultures encourage predatory behavior—
against shareholders, customers, subordinates, or co-workers—women
may find that they are more likely than men to be punished for engaging
in such behavior.
The literature on competition does show marked gender differences.
Laboratory studies using a general population find that women prefer less
competitive reward structures.302 When given a choice, for example,
between performing a task on a non-competitive piece-rate basis versus in
a contest, 73% of the men selected the contest while only 35% of the
women did so.303 Other studies find that it may not be competition per se,
but the purpose of the competition that produces the greatest gender
differences. One study distinguished between “hypercompetitives,” who
were more likely to be male, versus “personal development competitives,”
who were more likely to be female. The hypercompetitives endorsed the
value of power and control over others while the personal development
301. See, e.g., Kate Conger, Exclusive: Here’s the Full 10-Page Anti-Diversity Screed
Circulating Internally at Google, GIZMODO (Aug. 5, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/exclusive-heres-thefull-10-page-anti-diversity-screed-1797564320 [https://perma.cc/S9SQ-QV7G] (reprinting “Google
Guy” screed). But see Shuo Yan & Chunmian Ge, Gender Difference in Competition Preference and
Work Duration in the IT Industry: LinkedIn Evidence 6 (Thirty-Seventh Int’l. Conf. on Info. Sys.,
Dublin, Working Paper, 2016) (concluding that “changes of level of competition in the workplace will
change the gender gap in the work duration. The removing of ‘rank and yank’ system, which is a
highly competitive performance appraisal system, increases female employees’ work duration in the
IT industry”).
302. Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men
Compete too Much?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1067, 1078, 1097 (2007) (describing gender differences in
preferences for competition even when controlling for even after controlling for self-confidence in the
ability to perform the task); see also Jeffrey A. Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do
Competitive Workplaces Deter Female Workers? A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment on Gender
Differences on Job Entry Decisions, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 122, 124 (2015) (indicating the gender gap
in applications more than doubles when a large fraction of the wage depends on relative performance).
303. Deborah M. Weiss, All Work Cultures Discriminate, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 264
(2013) (citing Niederle & Vesterlund, supra note 302, at 1078, 1097).
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competitives “strongly endorsed values associated with social concern,
that is, with caring about the well-being of others and with treating them
with respect and as equals.”304 Not all competition is the same.
The way a position is constructed and advertised in these terms
influences the gender composition of the applicant pool. Indeed, simply
emphasizing monetary incentives rather than teamwork or customer
satisfaction increases the percentage of male applicants.305 So does
advertising that emphasizes a competitive environment generally.306 When
ads indicate that a large fraction of the wage (50%) depends on relative
performance, the gender gap in applications doubles,307 indicating a much
greater female aversion to such environments rather than simply an
aversion to competition by itself.308
The reason may have something to do with what we have described
elsewhere as the “triple bind.”309 The analysis starts with the classic double
bind. If women engage in the same predatory behavior as men, they are
judged harshly for not conforming to gender stereotypes,310 but if they fail
to do so, they may be viewed as lacking what it takes to succeed in
competitive environments.311 Our analysis then adds a third factor: women

304. Richard M. Ryckman et al., Values of Hypercompetitive and Personal Development
Competitive Individuals, 69 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 271, 271 (1997).
305. See, e.g., Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends,
and Explanations 38 n.60, 41 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21913, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21913.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y8X-L3QJ] (indicating that differences in
attitudes toward competition contributed to the gendered wage gap, and that competitive compensation
packages tended to depress female applications).
306. Danielle Gaucher et al., Evidence That Gendered Wording in Job Advertisements Exists
and Sustains Gender Inequality, 101 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 109 (2011) (showing that
ads using the terms “leader, competitive, [or] dominant” were seen as more appealing to men, while
words such as “support, understand, [and] interpersonal” were more associated with women).
307. See, e.g., Flory et al., supra note 151, at 124, 146.
308. Gender differences among professionals who stay in a field are, however, much less than
among the general population. See, e.g., Michael Kirchler et al., Rankings and Risk-Taking in the
Finance Industry, 73 J. FIN. 2271, 2275–76 (2018) (finding no differences in risk taking and male and
female professionals).
309. Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8, at 431.
310. See, e.g., Berdahl, supra note 3, at 432 (describing women and minorities as more likely to
be disliked and punished if they display the ambition, ruthlessness, and domination required to succeed
in masculinities contests); see also Peggy Klaus, Neither Men nor Mice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/jobs/07preoccupations.html [https://perma.cc/7KE4-W2M3].
308. When women defy gender role expectations, they face numerous repercussions in the
workplace. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 68 (2007) (characterizing women starting to climb
the corporate ladder as actually “walking a tightrope” because they must be sufficiently aggressive to
excel, but not overly aggressive because they will be perceived as pushy); Emily A. Leskinen et al.,
Gender Stereotyping and Harassment: A “Catch-22” for Women in the Workplace, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 192 (2015).
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become less likely to apply for such positions, increasing male dominance
within the workplace.312
Mark Egan, of the Harvard Business School, and his colleagues
provide a particularly telling example in their description of misconduct
among personal financial advisers—the job category that, as we
mentioned above, has the largest gender gap in compensation in the
economy. The study notes that misconduct in the industry is prevalent:
“Roughly 7% of financial advisers have a past record of misconduct.”313
The incidence of misconduct is gendered. Men are three times more likely
than women to engage in misconduct and twice as likely to be repeat
offenders. In addition, their offenses are 20% more costly to their
employers.314 Yet, women are 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30%
less likely to find new ones compared to men.315 In addition, the source of
the complaints for men and women differ. Customers initiate 55% of the
misconduct complaints against men while their employers initiate 28%.
For women, on the other hand, employer-initiated instances of misconduct
are almost as common as customer-initiated complaints (41% versus 44%,
respectively).316 In an industry in which predation against customers is
common and male domination of senior management is the norm, women
face greater risks than men—and a significant portion of those risks come
from their employers.317
The data the study provided identified the financial institutions with
the greatest gender gaps and generated headlines in the financial press with
the finding that “female financial planners at Wells Fargo were more than
25% more likely to experience a ‘job separation’ after misconduct than
their male counterparts.”318 The combination of predatory behavior and
gender disparities appears to have been particularly intense at Wells Fargo,
the bank whose employees described themselves as “lions hunting
zebras.”319
312. Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8, at 459.
313. Egan et al., supra note 11, at 2.
314. Id. at 4.
315. Id. at 11–14, 28.
316. Id. at 8–9.
317. See Ben Steverman, Proof Wall Street Is Still a Boys’ Club: Financial Advisory Firms Are
Far More Lenient with Men Who Break the Rules, a New Study Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-14/proof-wall-street-is-still-a-boys-club [https://
perma.cc/2CUS-EAKL].
318. Annalyn Kurtz, Wells Fargo 25% More Likely to Punish Women Employees Than Men,
Study Says, FORTUNE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/13/wells-fargo-financial-advisersgender-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/DBG4-WMFV].
319. Kaufman, supra 299, at 438 (quoting Stacy Cowley, ‘Lions Hunting Zebras’: Ex-Wells
Fargo Bankers Describe Abuses, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes. com/
2016/10/21/business/dealbook/lions-hunting-zebras-ex-wells-fargobankers-describe-abuses.html
[https://perma.cc/5SAR-U8K3]); see, e.g., James R. Koren, Former Wells Fargo Executives Say They
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Overall, numerous studies indicate that women are more likely than
men to support ethical business practices.320 While there is no agreement
on why, an easy conclusion is that women may have little choice. They do
not profit as much from the upsides of competitive—or predatory—
environments, and they face potentially more severe consequences for
their misdeeds when they do try to cash in.321
D. Anti-discrimination Laws Provide Little Redress
While masculinity contest cultures produce notable gender
disparities, anti-discrimination laws do not provide adequate redress for
three reasons. First, the courts have consistently cut back on the ability to
redress sex discrimination generally. Second, the courts tend to treat
business practices as legitimate and do not generally look beyond
employers’ stated reasons for their practices. Third, the shift from lockstep
raises and promotions to more individualized assessments makes unequal
treatment hard to prove. As a result, while anti-discrimination efforts
might be expected to shed greater light on the intersections between
predatory cultures and the negative impact on women, in fact, they do so
much less than highly publicized incidents, as we saw in the #MeToo
movement.
The first factor, the consistent undermining of anti-discrimination
law, has been well-documented.322 The Supreme Court has, for example,
made class action treatment more difficult, upheld mandatory arbitration
provisions, and generally interpreted statutory causes of action
Were Scapegoated for Accounts Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/business
/la-fi-wells-fargo-termination-20170901-story.html [https://perma.cc/VA8S-P8ZG] (describing
lawsuit alleging that Wells Fargo tried to blame fake accounts on male and female employees who
had complained about them, while protecting higher up males who bore greater responsibility).
320. See Egan et al., supra note 11, at 8–10; see also Damodar Suar & Jyotiranjan Gochhayat,
Influence of Biological Sex and Gender Roles on Ethicality, 134 J. BUS. ETHICS 199, 200 (2016) (“In
a meta-analysis of 14 studies, women were found to be more ethical than men in seven of the studies,
and no difference was observed in seven other studies (Ford and Richardson 1994). In another metaanalytic study of 66 pre-career student samples, women were found to have higher ethical standards
than men, but the difference between women and men declined as work experience increased (Franke
et al. 1997). In still another meta-analysis of 47 studies, 49% of the studies yielded a difference
between women and men in ethical behavior, 34% yielded no difference, and 17% provided mixed
results (Borkowski and Ugras 1998). Furthermore, in a qualitative review of the literature, while
some studies showed little or no difference between men and women, none found higher standards
of ethicality among men than among women (Kennedy and Lawton 1996). Combining the empirical,
meta-analytic, and qualitative studies, the weight of the evidence suggests that women are more
ethical than men.”).
321. See, e.g., CORDELIA FINE, TESTOSTERONE REX: MYTHS OF SEX, SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY
121 (2017) (indicating that women are less likely to take risks for career success in part because they
had lower expectations of success).
322. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 220, at 1449 (documenting the pro-business bias of
Republican appointees to the Supreme Court in an empirical study).
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narrowly.323 Moreover, the widespread use of non-disclosure agreements
makes discrimination cases less effective in casting light on workplace
abuses.324 The legal shift is part of a more general shift favoring employers
over workers and undercutting regulation in a variety of arenas.325
Second, anti-discrimination cases tend to assume the legitimacy of
the employers’ underlying business model, focusing exclusively on
unequal treatment of the protected group.326 In the Walmart litigation, for
example, an extensive literature describes the company’s union and wage
suppression activities.327 Further, the trial court’s eighty-four page opinion
extensively details the companies’ gender disparities, but does not discuss
the links between the policies such as frequent moves that disadvantage
women and wage suppression. Our research is the first that we have found
that explores the links between the two.328 The dilemma for plaintiffs’
lawyers is that the more a company’s actions appear tied to its business
model, the less those actions may appear to be motivated by discrimination
against women—and that, of course, may be true. Walmart may have
remained firm on insisting managerial moves, for example, long after it
realized that it restricted the number of women managers for reasons that
have very little to do with animus against women per se. Yet, Walmart
may also have been reluctant to publicly discuss the real reasons for the
policy, which encouraged managers not to identify with line employees
and thus gave Walmart a way of implementing national policies promoting
predatory labor practices while preserving upper management’s plausible
deniability.329 A broader approach to either class certification or disparate
impact litigation might have focused more attention on such policies.330 In
another example, a gender discrimination class action against Microsoft
323. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 342 (2011) (restricting availability of
class actions in sex discrimination cases); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018)
(upholding mandatory arbitration provisions in a five-four decision); see also Michael Selmi, Was the
Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 705–06 (2006) (maintaining that
disparate impact cases have largely been limited to the use of examinations that exclude minorities).
324. See Sarah David Heydemann & Sharyn Tejani, Legal Changes Needed to Strengthen the
#Metoo Movement, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 237, 262–64 (2019) (discussing effects of such
agreements on sexual harassment problems); Orley Lobel, NDA’s Are out of Control. Here’s What
Needs to Change, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-controlheres-what-needs-to-change [https://perma.cc/7CFX-NXNV] (describing employer use of
nondisclosure agreements to cloak workplace problems).
325. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 220.
326. See Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8.
327. See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 216.
328. See generally Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8.
329. Id.
330. A discussion of disparate impact litigation is beyond the scope of this article. See Selmi,
supra note 323, at 711 (describing limits of disparate impact analysis, which with the requisite showing
of a disparate impact on a protected group such as women, shifts the burden to the employer to show
a business necessity for the practice).
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survived preliminary defense motions on the basis of the gender disparities
involved in implementing its rank and yank evaluation system.331 The
case, even in its preliminary stages, generated unfavorable publicity on the
consequences of the competitive evaluation system, and persuaded
Microsoft to abandon it for reasons that may have little to do with its
impact on women.332 Yet, winning such cases is difficult, and some
scholars even maintain that the focus on the propriety of the business
practices is not the purpose of anti-discrimination law.333
Third, the shift from lockstep promotions and raises to individualized
evaluations and competitive pay makes disparate treatment on the basis of
gender harder to establish. Individual anti-discrimination claims must
show that the plaintiff was treated differently from a comparator because
of her sex.334 Yet, in workplaces where no two executives perform exactly
the same job or receive the same compensation, finding an appropriate
comparator and showing that the differences in treatment are due to
impermissible discrimination can be extremely difficult.335 Courts narrow
the focus in these cases to the specific basis for the plaintiff’s lack of a
promotion or bonus; they do not generally consider issues such as why a
bonus system was structured to reward revenue generation without taking
risk into account.336 And juries tend to view workplace success as
reflecting meritocratic judgments.337 The individualized nature of a
competitive pay system may obscure the discriminatory impact in much
the same way it may obscure the incentives for predation.338
331. Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8, at 481–82.
332. See Eichenwald, supra note 191 (attributing Microsoft’s failure to compete with other tech
giants to the evaluation system); see also Erika Anderson, The Management Approach Guaranteed to
Wreck Your Best People, FORBES (July 6, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikaandersen/2012/
07/06/the-management-approach-guaranteed-to-wreck-your-best-people/#27fc6eeb5743
[https://
perma.cc/3LD3-2YUE] (summarizing criticisms of rank and yank).
333. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 323 (describing role of disparate impact litigation in dismantling
barriers that had produced all white workplaces).
334. See Jessica A. Clarke, Feminism and the Tournament, 96 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 42, 45–46
(2018) (describing elements of disparate treatment litigation).
335. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“[S]tructural employment inequalities cannot be solved without
going beyond the generally accepted normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination law.”); Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99–100 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 458 (2001)
(describing the structural factors producing greater gender disparities).
336. Bagenstos, supra note 335, at 9 (“[I]t may be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to go
back and reconstruct the numerous biased evaluations and perceptions that ultimately resulted in an
adverse employment decision.”).
337. See Clarke, supra note 334, at 46.
338. Indeed, the effects of such systems may be to make decisions more subjective and
politicized. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 167, at 37.
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Ironically, this has made the #MeToo movement, which sparked a
public uproar about serial sexual harassers, more effective than litigation
in confronting abuses of power. Culprits like Roger Ailes, the head of Fox
News, and Harvey Weinstein, a prominent film producer, engaged in
abuses of power for decades339 in both their corporate and sexual realms
before egregious charges prompted their resignations.340 In a similar
fashion, it was sexual harassment allegations that forced out Uber head
Travis Kalanick, but the abuses in Uber’s management ethos extended
well beyond the harassment charges.341 These high profile sexual
harassment cases in many ways capture the intersection of predatory
business models and masculinity contest cultures better than any existing
anti-discrimination efforts; seeing the connections between the two sheds
a powerful light on how predatory workplaces manipulate and exploit both
corporate and personal power.
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed the ways that priming a corporation to
exploit asymmetries in information and power for the purpose of profit
maximization can create predatory cultures. Such cultures promote
individualism at the expense of institutional loyalty, generate short-term
earnings and share price increases at the expense of long-term company
health, and create workplaces hostile to women and other outsiders. They
may also undermine a variety of social ends, from confidence in markets
to productivity to gender equity.
These conclusions suggest that corporate management and external
regulations should be thought of together. In a society with strong
regulation of predatory practices, executive interests would align more
closely with creating ethical business cultures.
The analysis also suggests reconsideration of the role of gender in
creating and policing workplace cultures. This is a difficult issue. On the
one hand, most studies of existing managers find women to be more
ethical, more altruistic, and more attentive to group cohesion and wellbeing.342 On the other hand, as Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes
339. See Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https://perma.cc
/8TWF-EV6R].
340. See Gabriel Sherman, The Revenge of Roger’s Angels: How Fox News Women Took Down
the Most Powerful, and Predatory, Man in Media, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 5, 2016), http://nymag.
com/intelligencer/2016/09/how-fox-news-women-took-down-roger-ailes.html?mid=nymag_press
&gtm=top [https://perma.cc/9F3E-BCEV].
341. See Bensinger, supra note 250 (describing sexual harassment charges); Isaac, supra note
250 (detailing management culture).
342. See Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8.
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demonstrates, there are any number of narcissistic and Machiavellian
women willing to enter the tournament.343 Touting women’s advantages
or promoting them as a solution (“add women and stir”) risks reinforcing
existing sex stereotypes without fully taking on the reasons for these
cultures.344
We argue instead for a miners’ canary approach. The reason that
more diverse firms do better than homogenous ones may be that
maintaining diverse workforces requires greater cooperation and trust, and
adherence to the “rules of society . . . embodied in ethical custom”345—
factors that improve the operation of most firms.346 Doing so in a large
corporation involves not just substantive integrity but also procedural
regularity. At one time, we have called the process “bureaucratization” and
it would have been a positive term. Today, we prefer the word
“institutionalization,” and more generally, “the rule of law.” Those
engaged in predation are likely to bristle at the thought of corporate
officials or government regulators who get in the way of their objectives.
Sam Walton had no use for human resources (HR) specialists who would
have objected to wages and hours violations. Jack Welch held little respect
for auditors, who almost certainly would have objected to securities fraud.
Travis Kalnick, much like the rest of Silicon Valley start-up CEOs, is
unlikely to have listened to his HR specialists. Yet, adopting and
maintaining transparent and consistent rules and values tends to promote
both more successful institutional cultures and the ability to manage
diverse workplaces.
Neither shareholder primacy nor competitive pay need to be
abolished in their entirety. Instead, greater attention has to be paid to
establishing the “rules of the game” in transparent and consistent ways.
Shareholder value cannot promote greater societal well-being if it
produces short-term profit maximization through acts of predation likely
to spark public outcry or the collapse of the firm because of the lack of
internal controls that promote long-term sustainability.347 And, in this
context, diversity can be framed as a public good. Lack of it ought to
trigger greater scrutiny. The scrutiny should focus on something more than
whether company officials engaged in intentional discrimination. Instead,
the scrutiny should determine whether management culture invites
343. See generally JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY
STARTUP (2018) (describing Holmes’s fraudulent promotion of a Silicon Valley start-up promoting a
product that never worked).
344. For a critique along these lines, see Clarke, supra note 334.
345. Friedman, supra note 36.
346. See Walker, supra note 121, at 21 (statement of Professor Chris Hodges and Ruth
Steinholtz) (“[V]alues-driven businesses are more successful and sustainable than others.”).
347. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 188.
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politicization and favoritism that works to the exclusion of outsiders and
the lack of management accountability. Ultimately, the principle that
should govern is management responsibility for the predictable
consequences of its acts. Without plausible deniability, predation would
become a much less successful practice.

